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INTRODUCTION 
The international community has witnessed unprecedented 
incidents of piracy with increasingly blatant, sophisticated, daring, 
brazen, unrelenting, seemingly intractable, and audacious threats1 to 
international law, security at sea, and global trade.2  These incidents 
have frequently occurred in parts of the world where lawlessness 
prevails on land and spills into the sea, due in part to failures of the 
state.3  According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), 
the number of acts of piracy and armed robberies perpetrated against 
ships reached 5062 by June, 2009, up 36 since May, 2009, with most 
incidents occurring off the coast of Africa.4  With the exception of 
2005, the number of piracy incidents has increased dramatically each 
year.5  On January 16, 2009, the International Maritime Bureau 
                                        
 1. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1851, Preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008) 
(“Pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia have become more sophisticated and daring 
and have expanded in their geographic scope, notably evidenced by the hijacking of 
the M/V Sirius Star 500 nautical miles off the coast of Kenya and subsequent 
unsuccessful attempts well east of Tanzania.”). 
 2. International Maritime Organization, Introduction to IMO, 
http://www.imo.org/about/mainframe.asp?topic_id=3 (last visited June 3, 2010) 
(reporting that approximately ninety percent of world trade is conducted through 
maritime channels); see Michael Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea:  A Legal and 
Strategic Theory for Naval Anti-Piracy Operations, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 16 (2007) 
(reasoning that states are likely to continue to regard pirates as global outlaws due to 
the importance of maritime channels to world trade). 
 3. ICC Commercial Crime Services, International Chamber of Commerce, Pirate 
Attacks Off Somalia Already Surpass 2008 Figures, May 12, 2009, http://www.icc-
ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=352:pirate-attacks-off-
somalia-already-surpass-2008-figures&catid=60:news&Itemid=51 (reporting that the 
total number of pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden and off the east coast of Somalia 
for the first four months of 2009 surpassed the figure for all of 2008).  In all of 2008, 
there were 111 incidents, including the hijacking of 42 vessels.  Id.  However, in the 
first four months of 2009 alone, there were 29 successful hijackings out of 114 
attempted attacks.  Id.  Furthermore, in 2008, 815 crewmembers were taken hostage 
in the Gulf of Aden and off the east coast of Somalia.  Id.  In the first four months of 
2009, the number of hostages had already reached 478.  Id.  Incidents increased in 
spite of the heightened presence of international navies sweeping the waters off the 
Somali coast.  Id.  The level of attempted attacks showed that the pirates were 
unperturbed by this presence and, if anything, had stepped up operations in order to 
secure a higher success rate.  Id. 
 4. INT’L MARITIME ORG., REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST 
SHIPS:  ACTS REPORTED DURING JUNE 2009 (MSC.4/Circ.138) ¶ 2 (Jul. 7, 2009), 
available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D25980/ 
138.pdf. 
 5. INT’L MARITIME ORG., REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST 
SHIPS:  ANNUAL REPORT 2005 (MSC.4/Circ.81) ¶ 4 (Mar. 22, 2006) [hereinafter IMO 
ANNUAL REPORT 2005], available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/ 
data_id%3D14323/81-colour.pdf (stating that the number of incidents “reported to 
the Organization to have occurred or to have been attempted in 2005, was 266, a 
decrease of 64 (19%) over the figure for 2004”).  In 2005, the IMO reported that 
“[o]ver the period under review . . . [t]here was an increase in the number of 
incidents from 13 to 49 in East Africa and from 41 to 51 in the Indian Ocean, over 
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(IMB) reported an unprecedented 11% increase in the number of 
incidents of piracy or armed robbery at sea committed worldwide 
between 2007 and 2008.6  Of the 293 incidents that the IMB recorded 
for that year, 111 (38%) occurred off the coast of Somalia or in the 
Gulf of Aden.7 
Meanwhile, navies have been deployed, and some captured pirates 
have been sent to third-party countries to be prosecuted, but most 
have been released.8  Two issues have emerged from the current 
situation.  How should nations deal with the piracy problem in 
general?  What rights does international law grant to a suspected 
pirate?  The U.N. Security Council is concerned that Somalia’s lack of 
a domestic legal structure to deal with piracy has “hindered more 
robust international action against the pirates off the coast of 
Somalia” and has “led to pirates being released without facing 
justice.”9  Somalia’s responsibility for creating a framework is 
underscored by the Security Council’s note that 
the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation provides for parties to create 
criminal offences, establish jurisdiction, and accept delivery of 
persons responsible for or suspected of seizing or exercising 
control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of 
intimidation.10 
Available statistics underscore the magnitude and consequences of 
this legal labyrinth.  Official figures released by the U.S. Navy indicate 
that out of the 238 suspected pirates investigated by navies operating 
off the coasts of Somalia, barely half were prosecuted, and most were 
                                        
the 2004 figures.”  Id. ¶ 5.  Moreover, while the IMO observed a “decrease of 25 (9%) 
over the figure for 2005,” the organization indicated in its 2007 annual report that 
there was an “increase of 41 (17%) over the figure for 2006.”  Compare INT’L 
MARITIME ORG., REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS:  
ANNUAL REPORT 2006 (MSC.4/Circ.98) ¶ 4 (Apr. 13, 2007) [hereinafter IMO ANNUAL 
REPORT 2006], available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/ 
data_id%3D18566/98.pdf, with INT’L MARITIME ORG., REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND 
ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS:  ANNUAL REPORT 2007 (MSC.4/Circ.115) ¶ 4 (Apr. 10, 
2008) [hereinafter IMO ANNUAL REPORT 2007], available at http://www.imo.org/ 
includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D22585/115.pdf. 
 6. ICC Commercial Crime Services, International Chamber of Commerce, IMB 
Reports Unprecedented Rise in Maritime Hijackings, Jan. 16, 2009, http://www.icc-ccs.org 
/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=332:imb-reports-unprecedented-
rise-in-maritime-hijackings&catid=60:news&Itemid=51. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Jon Ungoed-Thomas & Marie Woolf, Navy Releases Somali Pirates Caught 
Red-Handed, TIMES ONLINE, Nov. 29, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/ 
world/africa/article6936318.ece (observing that pirates captured by the Royal Navy 
were often released because they were not captured “in the act of piracy”). 
 9. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 1. 
 10. Id. (abbreviation omitted). 
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released.11  In April, 2008, after North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) forces rescued twenty fishermen from pirates who seized a 
Belgian ship, the forces had to release the pirates because they had 
no legal authority to arrest them.12  It is clear that no nation seems 
interested in playing the role of “global policeman.”13  Pirates, 
particularly those operating off the coast of Somalia, have shown 
utter disregard for the law, largely because existing enforcement 
mechanisms have been deficient and the international community 
has not demonstrated a resolute will to reform piracy law. 
When ransoms are paid to pirates or when captured pirates are 
released, the international community inadvertently encourages the 
persistence of piracy with impunity, and it is “unlikely that piracy can 
be stopped if pirates are not prosecuted and punished.”14  Faced with 
a new generation of pirates, it is not longer sufficient to simply appeal 
to universal jurisdiction.  Whether a pirate can be prosecuted 
depends on where the pirate is captured, the nationality of the pirate, 
the nationality of the ship that arrests him, and the circumstances 
under which the pirate is arrested.15  These circumstances call into 
question the adequacy of enforcement mechanisms currently in place 
to combat international piracy, as there have been few normative and 
procedural developments.  Many of these challenges are rooted in 
the definition of piracy in international instruments, the level of 
international will to enforce piracy law, and the jurisdictional 
limitations of prosecuting piracy.16  The legal regime currently in 
place under both international and domestic criminal law is not 
sufficiently comprehensive to properly hold pirates responsible.17  
Although the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) mandates that nations utilize universal jurisdiction to 
                                        
 11. Oliver Hawkins, What To Do With A Captured Pirate, BBC NEWS, Mar. 10, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7932205.stm. 
 12. Todd Pitman & Katharine Houreld, NATO Forces Free 20 Fishermen; Sea Bandits 
Seize Belgian Ship, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 19, 2009, at A3. 
 13. Eugene Kontorovich, Opinion, Invoke Universal Jurisdiction to Prosecute Pirates 
Worldwide, NAT’L. L. J., May 11, 2009,  at 17. 
 14. Eugene Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Piracy off the Coast of 
Somalia, ASIL INSIGHTS, Feb. 6, 2009, http://www.asil.org/insights090206.cfm. 
 15. Hawkins, supra note 11. 
 16. See Donald R. Rothwell, Maritime Piracy and International Law, Crimes of 
War Project, Feb. 24, 2009, http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-piracy.html 
(arguing that the legal definition of piracy should be revised and that the 
international community should work together to formulate a coordinated approach 
to piracy). 
 17. See id. (noting that some states’ criminal justice systems are not equipped to 
adequately deal with piracy). 
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prosecute pirates on the high seas,18 few nations have actually done 
so.19  When the responsibility to prosecute belongs to every state, the 
practical effect is that no state seems to accept it, apart from those 
states that have immediate national interests at stake.20 
As pirates become more violent and audacious, the international 
response has been to send more navies to the effected region.21  In 
the short term, the presence of ships increases the speed with which 
pirates can be caught or dissuaded, but in the long term, the ships 
may prove to be insufficient, risky,22 and, at best, only an ad hoc 
solution.23  In fact, in October, 2009, it was acknowledged that 
“[a]lthough the international naval forces have stepped up patrols in 
the Gulf of Aden this year, relatively few of the pirates detained have 
faced trial because of the legal complexities involved.”24 
Granted, international navies have had some success in containing 
piracy, especially off the coast of Somalia where warships established 
a safe shipping lane and escorted ships with food aid into the 
country.25  Some have suggested that the long-term solution to piracy 
near Somalia is an effective government coupled with a well-
                                        
 18. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 105, Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 19. See Kontorovich, supra note 14 (explaining that states have been hesitant to 
exercise jurisdiction over pirates due to the difficulties and expenses associated with 
prosecution). 
 20. See id. (highlighting the fact that most instances of military action against 
pirates have been defensive acts). 
 21. See Pirates Hit Navy Ship ‘In Error’, BBC NEWS, Oct. 7, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8294858.stm (documenting the increased 
presence of naval ships from Britain, France, Germany, and Italy in waters adjacent 
to Somalia). 
 22. For example, pirates threatened to “execute the whole crew,” of a Chinese 
vessel—the De Xin Hai—if the Chinese Navy tried to rescue the crew rather than pay 
a ransom.  China Vows to Free Hijacked Ship, BBC NEWS, Oct. 20, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8315630.stm. 
 23. In fact, pirates are becoming more ubiquitous and evasive of navies in their 
operations.  Somali Pirates Snare Chinese Ship, Crew, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 20, 2009, at 
A3.  They use sophisticated equipment and so-called larger “mother ships” to enable 
them to strike hundreds of miles offshore.  Id.  A recent example involved the 
aforementioned Chinese cargo ship De Xin Hai, which Somali pirates attacked in the 
Indian Ocean about 700 miles (1100 kilometers) east of the Somali coastline, the 
farthest from shore pirates have ever struck.  Id. 
 24. Pirates Hit Navy Ship ‘In Error’, supra note 21. 
 25. Paul Reynolds, Rules Frustrate Anti-Piracy Efforts, BBC NEWS, Dec. 9, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7735144.stm.  Several other success stories have been 
reported:  “The Royal Navy . . . shot and killed two pirates and captured others.  The 
French staged a daring capture of pirates who had taken over a yacht.  The Indian 
navy thwarted two attempted hijacks, though the pirates in both cases got away.”  Id.  
Additionally, the U.S. Navy successfully rescued a ship captain, and in the process 
killed three pirates and captured a fourth.  US Captain Rescued From Pirates, BBC 
NEWS, Apr. 13, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7996087.stm. 
ISANGA.OFFTOPRINTER.CORREX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/2010  6:45 PM 
1272 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1267 
resourced coast guard.26  Others have proposed that western 
countries deploy their navies to the area, but this prospect is unlikely 
because those countries have no legal obligation to assist the 
international community in such a manner.27  Alternatively, some 
argue that commercial ships should be able to arm themselves in 
order to adequately respond to increasingly well-armed pirates, but 
this proposal has also been discouraged.28  In the end, no single 
country’s navy can be relied upon to constitute an international naval 
police force.  Even if one nation were to take on that responsibility, it 
is extremely difficult to effectively police the entire Indian Ocean, to 
say nothing of other parts of the globe where piracy is prevalent.  For 
the most part, states have limited their actions to negotiating with 
pirates in exchange for the release of hostages, but have gone no 
further.29 
International law enforcement—even if only complementary to 
national and regional efforts—is particularly helpful in cases where 
piracy occurs in waters off the coasts of developing countries where 
local law enforcement is nominal, nonexistent, or ineffective.30  
Indeed, the IMB attributes the rise in incidents of piracy, in part, to 
“the lack of proper law enforcement.”31 
                                        
 26. See Hawkins, supra note 11 (forewarning that until a solution is found, 
holding pirates accountable will be difficult). 
 27. See Kontorovich, supra note 13 (recognizing that few countries want to play 
the role of “global policeman”). 
 28. The IMO argues that “[c]arriage of arms on board ship may encourage 
attackers to carry firearms thereby escalating an already dangerous situation, and any 
firearms on board may themselves become an attractive target for an attacker.”  INT’L 
MARITIME ORG., PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS:  GUIDANCE TO SHIPOWNERS 
AND SHIP OPERATORS, SHIPMASTERS AND CREWS ON PREVENTING AND SUPPRESSING ACTS 
OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS (MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3) Annex, ¶ 46 
(May 29, 2002). 
 29. The IMO has stated:  “As these [pirates] are criminals under both 
international law and most national laws, this task will generally fall to the security 
forces of the States involved.  Governments should avoid engaging in negotiations 
with these criminals and seek to bring perpetrators of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships to justice.  Negotiating with criminals in a case regarding hijacking of a 
ship may encourage potential perpetrators to seek economic revenue through 
piracy.”  INT’L MARITIME ORG., PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS:   
RECOMMENDATIONS TO GOVERNMENTS FOR PREVENTING AND SUPPRESSING PIRACY AND 
ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS (MSC.1/Circ.1333) Annex, ¶ 2 (June 26, 2009). 
 30. See Leticia M. Diaz & Barry Hart Dubner, An Examination of the Evolution of 
Crimes at Sea and the Emergence of the Many Legal Regimes in Their Wake, 34 N.C. J. INT’L 
L. & COM. REG. 521, 524 (2009) (citing INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BUREAU,  
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS:  
ANNUAL REPORT—2007, at 24 (2008) [hereinafter IMB ANNUAL REPORT 2007] 
(predicting that the only way to prevent additional acts of piracy is through the 
intervention of the international community). 
 31. IMB ANNUAL REPORT 2007, supra note 30, at 24. 
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The United Nations has responded with ad hoc resolutions to help 
address the law enforcement lacuna.  For instance, a provision in the 
UNCLOS prohibits states from engaging in the hot pursuit of 
suspected pirates in the territorial waters of another coastal state.32  
Provisions such as this one illustrate how the UNCLOS is premised 
upon a traditional understanding of piracy—one that assumes that 
the state system works effectively and that a state can enforce its own 
laws in its territorial sea.33  However, as recent events demonstrate, 
this is often not the case.  Pirates have become organized, 
technologically advanced, and versatile34—a development that 
explodes traditional understandings of piracy.  Hence, there is an 
urgency for international law to more adequately respond to this 
formidable phenomenon that has evolved in nature and scope.  Ad 
hoc U.N. Resolutions have proven to be temporary and limited in 
their long-term effectiveness because they apply only in a given 
situation.35 
Another misguided response has been the over-reliance on third 
states (those not directly involved) to prosecute suspected pirates.36  
This practice, however, is a subject of concern because of due process 
issues prevalent in these third states.37  What constraints are faced by 
third states—which rarely have a large stake in maritime trade—when 
it comes to prosecution of pirates? 
As long as pirates perceive that the international community is 
unwilling or lacking the capacity to prosecute, piracy will continue to 
thrive.  It is evident that piracy threatens international trade and 
maritime life throughout the world.  Not only does piracy cause 
substantial disruption and loss to the world economy, which is heavily 
reliant on maritime shipping, it also leads to escalating costs 
associated with increasingly steep ransom demands and higher 
                                        
 32. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 111, ¶ 3. 
 33. See Rothwell, supra note 16 (explaining that international piracy law tasks 
countries with policing acts of piracy in their own territorial waters). 
 34. Saeed Ahmed, High-Tech Pirates Are No Romantic Figures, CNN.COM, April 29, 
2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/04/29/pirates/index.html.  Pirates 
charge against or escape from their targets using high-speed vessels linked to a 
special mother vessel.  Id.  They wear night-vision goggles, carry rocket launchers, 
and use global-positioning devices for navigation.  Id. 
 35. See Rothwell, supra note 16 (criticizing the fact that the U.N. Security 
Council’s Resolutions only dealt with piracy in Somali waters). 
 36. See Hawkins, supra note 11 (discussing agreements entered into by Kenya and 
both the United States and the European Union which provide that Kenya will 
prosecute pirates). 
 37. See id. (discussing concerns raised by human rights groups as to the adequacy 
of Kenya’s justice system). 
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insurance premiums.38  This Article recommends various normative 
and procedural reforms and, in particular, advocates for the 
expansion of the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal on the 
Law of the Sea (ITLOS) as a permanent forum for the prosecution of 
suspected pirates. 
To this end, the Article consists of six parts.  Part I evaluates the 
common practice of outsourcing piracy enforcement and the various 
legal and non-legal problems that follow as a result of such practice.  
Part II analyzes the definition of piracy in the context of international 
law instruments and addresses the relevant jurisdictional implications 
of that definition.  Part III focuses on the response of the United 
Nations to piracy, and, in particular, the U.N. Security Council’s 
efforts in Africa.  Part IV discusses the ITLOS and the respective roles 
that international jurisdiction and universal jurisdiction play in the 
prosecution of piracy.  Part V looks at the methods by which piracy 
law is enforced on both national and local levels, with special 
attention to Somalia.  Lastly, Part VI recommends that particular 
areas of piracy law be expanded, and ultimately calls for broader 
approaches to the problem in order to build a more robust system of 
enforcement. 
I.  OUTSOURCING PIRACY LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Under the existing legal framework, piracy is uniquely situated in 
international law.  When a pirate is captured on the high seas outside 
the territory of a particular state, the municipal laws of the capturing 
state—not international laws—determine how the pirate will be 
punished.39  This reliance on municipal enforcement has led to 
notable failures, one being the rarity in which piracy cases are 
                                        
 38. There is no quantitative research available regarding the total cost of global 
piracy, and estimates vary widely.  Stephanie Hanson, Combating Maritime Piracy, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Jan. 7, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/publication/ 
18376/.  Experts disagree over whether insurance premiums, freight rates, and 
rerouting costs should be considered together with the cost of ransoms.  Id.  Some 
analysts suggest that global piracy costs $1 billion a year, while others estimate the 
cost to be as high as $16 billion.  Id. 
 39. See UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 105 (“On the high seas, or in any other place 
outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or 
a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the 
persons and seize the property on board.  The courts of the State which carried out 
the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine 
the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the 
rights of third parties acting in good faith.”).  But see Michael H. Passman, Protections 
Afforded to Captured Pirates Under the Law of War and International Law, 33 TUL. MAR. 
L.J. 1, 10–11 (2008) (“Although pirates are punished under the municipal law of the 
state that holds them, their capture outside the jurisdiction of a state is made possible 
by international law”). 
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actually brought in municipal courts.  For example, in 2009, a U.S. 
District Court tried a suspected pirate involved in the dramatic 
hijacking of the M/V Maersk Alabama—the first piracy prosecution in 
the United States since the late 19th century.40  The rarity of such 
cases highlights the complete failure of international law as a 
response to piracy.  Although hundreds of pirates have been caught 
by the coalition led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) that patrolled the Gulf of Aden, only a few have been 
brought back to the capturing nation to be prosecuted.41  One Danish 
frigate, after seizing a pirate vessel, released the pirates shortly 
afterward, claiming that it did not know what to do with them.42  In 
another case, the Royal Navy released pirates after confiscating their 
equipment.43 
There are several explanations for the failure to bring pirates to 
justice.  Not only is prosecuting pirates burdensome, entailing 
innumerable logistical difficulties, it is also expensive and time-
intensive as it can involve novel legal questions.44  Additionally, some 
states are reluctant to prosecute pirates because their legal regimes 
are inadequate or because piracy presents delicate political 
considerations.45  Although these obstacles are not insurmountable, 
they still effectively deter states from prosecuting pirates, particularly 
when states are not immediately affected by piracy.46 
A. Obstacles to Working with Third Countries  
One of the responses to the challenges of enforcement of piracy 
law has been to enter into agreements with third countries, mainly 
developing countries, to prosecute suspected pirates.47  While there 
are doubts about the long-term sustainability of this approach,48 there 
are also legal concerns.  For instance, “[t]he legality of transfers from 
outside capturing states to third states is thrown into doubt by the 
piracy provisions of [the UNCLOS].”49  The drafting history reveals 
                                        
 40. Kontorovich, supra note 13; see also Hicks v. Waterman S.S. Corp., No. H-09-
1601, 2009 WL 4572776 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2009). 
 41. Kontorovich, supra note 13. 
 42. See Hawkins, supra note 11 (noting the Danish Foreign Ministry’s opinion 
that they could not try the pirates domestically). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Kontorovich, supra note 13. 
 45. Rothwell, supra note 16. 
 46. Kontorovich, supra note 15. 
 47. See Hawkins, supra note 11 (noting agreements entered into the United 
States, the European Union, and Kenya, for Kenya to accept pirates for prosecution). 
 48. See id. (questioning how long Kenya will continue to accept jurisdiction). 
 49. Kontorovich, supra note 14; see UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 105 (providing 
that “every State may seize a pirate ship” on the high seas, but that prosecution of 
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that this provision was intended to preclude transfers to third states.50  
In an effort to deal with piracy off the coast of Somalia, Resolution 
1851 authorizes “shiprider” agreements to facilitate more effective 
law enforcement capability.51  The Resolution states that the purpose 
of these agreements is to “facilitate the investigation and prosecution 
of persons detained as a result of operations conducted under this 
Resolution for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of 
Somalia.”52  The resolution also addresses several issues related to 
piracy prosecution, stating that agreements may be made, 
provided that the advance consent of the [Transitional Federal 
Government] is obtained for the exercise of third state jurisdiction 
by shipriders in Somali territorial waters and that such agreements 
or arrangements do not prejudice the effective implementation of 
the [1988 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation] Convention.53 
U.N. Member States are bound to carry out the decisions of the 
U.N. Security Council,54 a body that has power to modify obligations 
under the UNCLOS.55  Pursuant to the foregoing Security Council 
resolution, the European Union signed an agreement with Kenya for 
Nairobi to prosecute suspected pirates captured by E.U. vessels.56  The 
adjudicatory effectiveness of an arrangement such as this, however, 
can hinge on economic, judicial, legal, and even political factors.  
The legal systems of some countries only provide for personal or 
                                        
suspected pirates should be conducted by the “courts of the State which carried out 
the seizure”). 
 50. See REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 
U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., Supp. No. 9 at 29, U.N. Doc. A/3150 (Apr. 23–July 4, 1956) 
[hereinafter ILC REPORT 1956] (“This article gives any State the right to seize pirate 
ships . . . and to have them adjudicated upon by its courts.  This right cannot be 
exercised at a place under the jurisdiction of another State.”). 
 51. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 1, ¶ 5. 
 52. Id. ¶ 3. 
 53. Id. 
 54. U.N. Charter art. 25 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept 
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present 
Charter.”). 
 55. See id. art. 103 (“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the 
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations 
under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present 
Charter shall prevail.”). 
 56. Katharine Houreld, Piracy Suspects Appear in Kenya Courts, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 
24, 2009, at A7.  Currently, Kenyan Courts are prosecuting suspected pirates sent to 
them by Germany, Britain and France.  Id.  Western nations are often reluctant to try 
Somali suspects who might try to claim asylum.  See Ungoed-Thomas & Woolf, supra 
note 8 (suggesting that the Royal Navy releases pirates to avoid asylum claims that 
might arise if the pirates are prosecuted in Europe). 
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national criminal jurisdiction.57  Thus, a country’s ability to prosecute 
arrested pirates depends on its own laws.  This was the problem that 
the Danish Navy faced when it captured the flagship Absalon and 
detained ten suspected armed pirates in the seas off Somalia after 
they had allegedly attacked merchant ships that were not Danish.58  
The Danish authorities had nowhere to take them because Denmark 
could only exercise national criminal jurisdiction if the pirates had 
attacked a Danish ship or Danish citizens; thus, Denmark was barred 
from prosecuting.59  Instead, Denmark looked to other states to 
conduct the prosecution, but more complications arose, such as 
insufficient evidence for those states to convict.60  As a result, 
Denmark had no choice but to release the pirates off the shore of 
Somalia.61 
Kenya and Puntland have recently been designated as the prime 
destinations for piracy prosecution.62  But there are doubts that Kenya 
can handle the costly and complicated task of trying cases that 
emerge from the exploding piracy crisis, because the country 
continues to struggle with its own backlog of criminal and civil cases.63  
Other nations have even handed over captured pirates to the 
internationally unrecognized breakaway state of Puntland, located in 
North Eastern Somalia, for prosecution.64  Most of the pirates sent to 
Puntland came from Puntland, and it is unclear how long the pirates 
would actually stay in prison if they were convicted and sentenced in 
that state.65  According to experts, a pirate’s stay in a Puntland prison 
is often brief because criminals there are able to either walk out or 
bribe officials for their release.66  Nonetheless, forty-five of the fifty-
                                        
 57. See Rothwell, supra note 16 (explaining that international piracy law does not 
usually extend to offshore attacks). 
 58. Hawkins, supra note 11. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. (reporting Kenya’s agreement with the United States and the 
European Union to try pirates in its courts). 
 63. See id. (reiterating sentiments that the Kenyan justice system is corrupt and 
unfair). 
 64. Id.  Somalia is currently split into several parts.  Reynolds, supra note 25.  The 
capital, Mogadishu, is nominally under the control of a transitional government.  Id.  
The breakaway Islamist group al-Shabab controls most of the south and central areas 
of the country.  Id.  The pirates, however, are based further north in Puntland, a 
semi-autonomous region, with the main pirate base in the port of Eyl.  Id.  
Somaliland is around the coast, and is currently seeking independence.  Id.  In light 
of these developments, the chances that the world will soon see a peaceful and 
united Somalia are stark. 
 65. Hawkins, supra note 11. 
 66. Id.; see also Reynolds, supra note 25 (“There is a president [of Puntland] but 
he has either no power or no interest in stopping a lucrative form of income.  It is 
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seven pirates caught by the French Navy during recent operations 
have been transferred to Puntland authorities.67  The U.S. Navy also 
sent nine pirates to Puntland, which means that Puntland accounted 
for nearly half of the pirates reported to be facing prosecution in the 
region.68 
B. Jurisdictional Constraints  
Amidst the transfer of pirates to third countries, jurisdictional 
questions have inevitably surfaced.  For example, in Hassan M. Ahmed 
v. Republic of Kenya,69 the suspected pirates attacked an Indian 
merchant ship 275–280 miles off the Somali coast in January, 2006.70  
After the U.S. Navy captured the suspects aboard an Indian dhow, 
they transferred them to Kenyan authorities for prosecution.71  At the 
time, the U.N. Security Council had not yet passed the resolution that 
would authorize the lawful extradition of piracy suspects to third 
countries for prosecution.72  Still, the court invoked the UNCLOS and 
universal jurisdiction under customary international law as the basis 
for its jurisdiction.73  The defense argued that the Kenyan court had 
no jurisdiction to hear the matter because the suspects were arrested 
in Somalia’s 200-nautical-mile territorial sea, and submitted that the 
proper venue for the trial would be Somalia or India.74  The basis of 
this contention was that none of the parties involved were Kenyan, 
thus ruling out personal jurisdiction, and that the offense was 
committed miles away from the Kenyan coast, thus ruling out 
territorial jurisdiction.75  The Kenyan court considered these 
arguments, but ultimately rejected the defense’s appeal.76  With the 
requisite legislation, Kenyan courts could prosecute piracy through 
the principle of universal jurisdiction, which would grant them 
                                        
believed that the money gained from ransom is more than the income of the local 
government of Puntland.”). 
 67. Hawkins, supra note 11. 
 68. Id. 
 69. (2009) eKLR (H.C.K.) (Kenya). 
 70. Id. at 1–2. 
 71. Id. at 3. 
 72. Resolution 1851 was passed in December, 2008.  S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 1. 
 73. Ahmed, eKLR at 7. 
 74. Piracy Suspects Challenge Court, NEWS24.COM, Feb. 6, 2006, 
http://www.news24.com/Content/Africa/News/965/5db1f9fef91244e8aa62aa5cc95
bdd0e/06-02-2006-03-04/Piracy_suspects_challenge_court. 
 75. Ahmed, eKLR at 5. 
 76. Id. at 7. 
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competence to try pirates even if the pirates were captured by 
another state.77 
However, a close reading of the UNCLOS indicates that customary 
international law does not establish universal jurisdiction in cases of 
extradition, and that such jurisdiction would be contrary to the terms 
of the treaty which provide that the capturing country should carry 
out the prosecution.78  Indeed, some countries might even be in 
breach of their international obligations if they extradite suspected 
pirates to other countries if it is likely that the receiving country will 
violate the pirate’s human rights.79  The commentary for Article 43 of 
the UNCLOS provides that the article gives “any State the right to 
seize pirate ships (and ships seized by pirates) and to have them 
adjudicated upon by its courts,” but this right is not transferrable to 
another state.80  This provision articulates universal jurisdiction 
insofar as it permits any state that seizes pirates on the high seas to 
subject the pirates to prosecution in a state’s domestic courts.81  The 
provision does not, however, permit that state to try pirates if it 
captures them in the territorial waters of another state.82  Piracy, as 
defined in the UNCLOS, must occur on the high seas, outside the 
jurisdiction of any single state.83  Thus, unless a state’s legislation 
explicitly provides for piracy as such, it will not be punishable under 
its domestic law.84 
C. Contending with Unreliable Courts 
The use of third countries in the prosecution of suspected pirates 
raises both due process and long-term sustainability concerns 
                                        
 77. See generally Kontorovich, supra note 13 (explaining that the legal concept of 
universal jurisdiction allows any nation to prosecute pirates). 
 78. See UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 105 (“On the high seas, or in any other place 
outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or 
a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the 
persons and seize the property on board.  The courts of the State which carried out the 
seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the 
action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights 
of third parties acting in good faith.” (emphasis added)). 
 79. See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. 8 (ser. A) (1989).  
Soering resisted extradition to the United States—which permits the imposition of 
the death penalty and the “death row phenomenon”—on the ground that the 
United Kingdom would be violating its obligations under the European Convention 
on Human Rights regarding the prohibition of inhumane or degrading treatment.  
Id. at 30–31.  The European Court of Human Rights agreed.  Id. at 50. 
 80. ILC REPORT 1956, supra note 50, at 29. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See id. (requiring seizure to occur outside the jurisdiction of a state). 
 83. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 101. 
 84. Tina Garmon, International Law of the Sea:  Reconciling the Law of Piracy and 
Terrorism in the Wake of September 11th, 27 TUL. MAR. L.J. 257, 264 (2002). 
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regarding whether the process guarantees fair procedures.  Can 
Kenyan courts, for example, act as an effective default tribunal for 
the prosecution of pirates, or are they being used on a merely ad hoc 
basis?85  From a procedural standpoint, are they sufficiently equipped 
for the task?86  Some have observed that the Kenyan courts have 
“scant judicial resources” and a huge “backlog of cases.”87  For these 
reasons, and in consideration of the international ramifications at 
stake, piracy cases ought to be tried in courts that are sufficiently 
equipped to handle piracy cases. 
The Kenyan judiciary itself is rife with problems, as judges operate 
under either a cloud of corruption or a lack of independence.  For 
example, in 2005, the International Commission of Jurists reported 
that in Kenya, “five out of nine Court of Appeal justices, 18 out of 36 
High Court justices and 82 out of 254 magistrates were implicated as 
corrupt,” and noted that judicial corruption has severely impeded 
development of the rule of law in Kenya.88  Corruption in the Kenyan 
judiciary is persistent, endemic, and quite intractable.89  During a visit 
to Kenya in August, 2009, the U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham 
Clinton, acknowledged the shortcomings in Kenya’s judiciary by 
using a phrase commonly heard in Kenya:  “Why hire a lawyer when 
you can buy a judge.”90  If the national courts of countries that 
capture suspected pirates will not prosecute them, and if outsourcing 
that responsibility to third countries is problematic, then the 
responsibility of resolving piracy is left to the international 
community, and its use of international law, to try to resolve the issue.  
First among the efforts of the international community must be an 
examination of the adequacy of the existing legal framework. 
                                        
 85. See Robert Marquand, Sticky Legal Battles Await for Captured Somali Pirates, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 14, 2009, at 5–6 (noting that “Mombasa [was] acting as 
a kind of Hague international tribunal for pirate crime”). 
 86. See Bahar, supra note 2, at 81 (explaining that in many Kenyan courts, 
magistrates must transcribe the testimony of witnesses by hand and prosecutors tend 
to lack the requisite time and resources to effectively prosecute cases). 
 87. Id. 
 88. INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, KENYA:  JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, CORRUPTION AND 
REFORM 3–4 (2005). 
 89. See id. at 3 (raising the concern that although many of the judges who were 
implicated as corrupt had resigned, those taking over the vacated positions may have 
been selected based on political, tribal, or sectarian connections). 
 90. Clinton in Kenya Urges a Cleanup of Corruption, CNN.COM, Aug. 6, 2009, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/08/06/clinton.kenya/index.html. 
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II.  LAW OF THE SEA AND PIRACY:   
ISSUES OF DEFINITION AND JURISDICTION 
Some enforcement constraints arise in connection with the scope 
of the substantive provisions of the UNCLOS itself.  If international 
law regarding piracy is inadequate, one of the primary protective 
safeguards against piratical acts would be severely limited with respect 
to both the scope of protection as well as the extent to which 
jurisdiction can be exercised.91  If an act of piracy does not fall within 
the ambit of the UNCLOS, an institution or state that prosecutes 
pirates at the international level would not have jurisdiction unless 
the Convention’s provisions also conferred on it sufficient subject 
matter jurisdiction.92  These issues call for an analysis of not only the 
sufficiency and efficacy of existing enforcement institutional 
mechanisms from a procedural standpoint, but also an analysis of the 
adequacy of the substantive laws that are used to combat piracy.  
Several commentators have undertaken studies on the normative 
adequacy of piracy provisions under the UNCLOS.93  Even the United 
Nations has recently recognized similar inadequacies, and to that 
end, has sought to supplement the UNCLOS by passing a number of 
legally binding resolutions.94 
A. Defining Piracy 
To begin, when confronted with an act of violence at sea, a state 
must ask:  Where did the act take place?  Questions of jurisdiction will 
be resolved once it is determined whether the act took place in parts 
of the sea under the sovereignty of the coastal state,95 or instead, in 
                                        
 91. See Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, The New “Jamaica Discipline”:  Problems with Piracy, 
Maritime Terrorism and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 6 CONN. J. INT’L L. 127, 
146 (1990) (estimating that “less than one in five recent incidents of maritime 
violence would qualify as high seas piracy under [UNCLOS],” and arguing that 
UNLCOS reduces the basis for international jurisdiction over piratical crimes). 
 92. See Rothwell, supra note 16 (explaining that modern international law on 
piracy does not cover attacks occurring within the territorial sea of a coastal state, 
thereby typically rendering the international community powerless to prosecute). 
 93. See, e.g., Menefee, supra note 91, at 141–48 (detailing alleged defects in 
UNCLOS, including the lack of clarity over what constitutes an illegal act and the 
requirement that a piratical act be committed for a private end). 
 94. See infra Part III (discussing how the United Nations has adopted resolutions 
conferring maritime powers not granted in UNCLOS to member states in order to 
allow them to conduct antipiracy operations in Somali waters and to facilitate the 
prosecution of suspected pirates). 
 95. Under UNCLOS, areas under the sovereignty of the coastal state include:  
Internal Waters and Ports (Arts. 8 and 11); Territorial Sea (Art. 2); and Archipelagic 
Waters (Art. 49), including onboard vessels of the flag state (Art. 92).  UNCLOS, 
supra note 18.  Under Article 105 of UNCLOS, any state can arrest and prosecute acts 
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international waters.96  If taking place in an area under the 
sovereignty of a coastal state, the act would likely be a criminal 
offense under the laws of the coastal state.97  The UNCLOS 
enumerates specific acts that constitute piracy.98  The UNCLOS 
definition of piracy, adopted from the definition provided in the 
1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas,99 provides: 
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:  (a) any illegal acts of 
violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a 
private aircraft, and directed:  (i) on the high seas, against another 
ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship 
or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place 
outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary 
participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with 
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act of 
inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in 
subparagraph (a) or (b).100 
Some contemporary commentators understand this definition to 
be a codification of the customary international law on piracy.101  If it 
                                        
of piracy even if such acts are committed in international waters, regardless of 
whether the vessels were carrying the state’s flag or not. 
 96. Under UNCLOS, areas under international waters include:  High Seas (Art. 
86) and Exclusive Economic Zones (Art. 58(2)).  Id. 
 97. Rothwell, supra note 16. 
 98. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 101. 
 99. United Nations Convention on the High Seas, arts. 15–18, April 29, 1958, 13 
U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 11. 
 100. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 101 (emphasis added). 
 101. See, e.g., Erik Barrios, Note, Casting a Wider Net:  Addressing the Maritime Piracy 
Problem in Southeast Asia, 28 B. C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 149, 153 (2005) (explaining 
that if UNCLOS is treated as a codification of customary international law on piracy, 
all states, whether they are signatories or not, would be bound by the UNCLOS 
definition).  Other commentators, however, argue either that there is “no custom 
regarding a modern definition of piracy” or that the UNCLOS definition is only a 
partial codification of the customary law on piracy.  John E. Noyes, Introduction to the 
International Law of Piracy, 21 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 105, 109 (1990) (quoting Barry Hart 
Dubner, Piracy in Contemporary National and International Law, 21 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 
139, 143 (1990).  If one considers customary international law to be broader than 
UNCLOS, then, some argue, customary international law may be applicable to 
incidents involving insurgents or terrorists not otherwise part of the UNCLOS 
definition.  Id.  The two regimes of international law can exist separately.  In Military 
and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), the International 
Court of Justice held that customary international law concerning the right of a state 
to use force against another state exists separately from such rules as those contained 
in the U.N. Charter, even where the two categories of law are largely identical.  
Military, 1986 I.C.J. ¶¶ 172–82.  This holding highlights the indefinite meaning of 
piracy in customary international law, which seems so amorphous that different 
commentators reach different conclusions as to “the outer limits of a rule of 
customary international law proscribing piracy.”  Noyes, supra note 101, at 110.  
Professor Rubin, in his comprehensive study of piracy since Greek and Roman times, 
argues that the concept of piracy reveals no consistent practice.  ALFRED P. RUBIN, 
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is, then even states that are not parties to the UNCLOS may be 
bound, under appropriate conditions, by the same definition.102  But 
does this mean that the definition is sufficient to meet contemporary 
challenges? 
The “core meaning” of this definition is that piracy involves 
“individuals on one private ship [attacking] another ship on the high 
seas, solely for private, commercial gain.”103  In a world where non-
state organizations that commit piratical acts are becoming 
increasingly assertive, as evidenced by the increase in pirate attacks 
occurring in the Gulf of Aden and in the waters off the coasts of 
Somalia and West Africa,104 several contemporary commentators resist 
a definition of piracy that does not include reference to terrorist or 
political activity.105  It would be self-defeating, they argue, to restrict 
the definition of piracy to commercially motivated acts when acts 
meant to promote terror or political objectives can pose a similar 
threat to safety at sea.106  The increase in political motives inextricably 
linked to illegal activities at sea demonstrates that a distinction 
between motives is no longer sustainable in a world where non-state 
actors are either as powerful or more powerful than some states.  In 
the Niger Delta, for instance, the rebels justify their recourse to 
piracy by citing political objectives.107  Similarly, pirates in Somalia 
have used their ransom money to advance their own extremist 
political objectives.  Recent United Nations reports indicate that 
                                        
THE LAW OF PIRACY 1–2 (2d ed. 1988).  A rule of customary international law requires 
fairly consistent state practice with a sense of legal authority or opinio juris vel 
necessitatis.  Noyes, supra note 101, at 109–10. 
 102. See Malvina Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas:  The Achille Lauro, Piracy 
and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AM J. INT’L L. 269, 272 n.12 (1988) 
(explaining that customary international law recognizes absolute universal 
jurisdiction over the crime of piracy and, as a result, the location where the piratical 
act is committed is largely irrelevant). 
 103. See Noyes, supra note 101, at 109. 
 104. See Int’l Maritime Org., Piracy in the Waters off the Coast of Somalia, 
http://www.imo.org/Facilitation/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1178 (last visited June 3, 
2010) (reporting that the frequency of piratical attacks in East Africa has risen 
astronomically, with new incidents reported almost daily in 2008). 
 105. See, e.g., Garmon, supra note 84, at 275 (advancing the position that in order 
to effectively combat terrorism, it is necessary to include in the UNCLOS definition 
of piracy piratical acts motivated by political objectives). 
 106. See Halberstam, supra note 102, at 289 (observing the similarities between 
terrorists and pirates include that (1) they both threaten all states by attacking many 
states indiscriminately and (2) generally no one state can be held responsible for 
their acts). 
 107. See Ukoha Ukiwo, From “Pirates” to “Militants”:  A Historical Perspective on Anti-
state and Anti-oil Company Mobilization Among the Ijaw of Warri, Western Niger Delta, 106 
AFR. AFF. 587, 603 (2007) (explaining that “violent mobilization was justified on the 
grounds that previous appeals for understanding had failed to yield the desired 
objectives of self-determination”). 
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“[t]here are increasing reports of complicity by members of the 
Somali region of ‘Puntland’ administration in piracy activities” and 
that “[i]t is widely acknowledged that some of these [piracy] groups 
now rival established Somali authorities in terms of their military 
capabilities and resource bases.”108  Some legal scholars argue that the 
“private ends” criterion should include acts committed by groups or 
persons, such as rebel groups, “that rob or arrest a [vessel] for a 
ransom as a fundraiser scheme to fund their political activities.”109  Yet 
other scholars find support in customary international law that the 
prohibition against piracy also covers political acts.110  In support of 
this contention, some scholars cite domestic case law.111  However, it is 
unlikely that such domestic cases will override the clear letter of the 
UNCLOS.112 
B. Terrorist and Political Acts in the Context of Piracy 
Terrorist concerns have not escaped the attention of 
commentators.113  If there are state-sponsors of terrorism,114 why would 
                                        
 108. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 1846 (2008), ¶¶ 5, 7, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, 
U.N. Doc. S/2009/146 (Mar. 16, 2009). 
 109. See, e.g., H.E. José Luis Jesus, Protection of Foreign Ships Against Piracy and 
Terrorism at Sea:  Legal Aspects, 18 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 363, 379 (2003) 
(arguing that “grey areas . . . make it difficult to distinguish an act for ‘private ends’ 
from an act in pursuit of a politically-motivated one”). 
 110. See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 102, at 289 (stating that although customary 
international law does not have a clear definition of piracy, terrorist acts would most 
likely be considered piracy under customary international law). 
 111. See, e.g., John Kavanagh, The Law of Contemporary Sea Piracy, 1999 AUSTL. INT’L 
L.J. 127, 139–40 (looking to Australian case law to determine “who is a pirate”).  The 
Australian case R. v. Walton, (1827) N.S.W.S. Ct. Cas. 7 (Austrl.), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/special/NSWSupC/1827/7.html, is instructive on this 
point.  In Walton, sixty-six convicts seized control of a vessel but were careful not to 
harm the seamen who became their captives.  Id.  The convicts expressed their 
intention to return the brig and its cargo once they achieved their liberty.  Id.  When 
they were captured, the convicts were nevertheless convicted of the offense of piracy.  
That is why Viscount Sankey said in In re Piracy Jure Gentium, (1934) A.C. 586 (U.K.), 
that “[w]hen it is sought to be contended, as it was in this case, that armed men 
sailing the seas on board a vessel . . . could attack and kill everybody on board 
another vessel . . . without committing the crime of piracy unless they stole 
[something,] . . . their Lordships are almost tempted to say that a little common 
sense is a valuable quality in the interpretation of international law.”  Id. at 594. 
 112. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 339 (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”). 
 113. See Jesus, supra note 109, at 363 (noting “a spiraling increase of piratical and 
terrorist attacks against shipping and persons on board,” in addition to 
“unprecedented maritime insecurity in modern times”). 
 114. For example, in response to the attacks on the World Trade Center in New 
York on September 11, 2001, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1373 
recognizing that the attacks had taken place with governmental support.  S.C. Res. 
1373, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
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it be impossible to have state sponsors of piracy?115  Current trends 
indicate that piracy has turned increasingly violent and deadly.116  The 
IMB reports, for instance, that “[i]n the first six months of 2008 . . . 
11 vessels were fired upon . . . [a] total of 190 crew members were 
taken hostage, six kidnapped, seven killed and another seven are 
missing, presumed dead.”117  Additionally, reports of the IMO indicate 
that, in many cases, pirates have taken hostage the crew of captured 
ships and have even threatened to kill members of the crew, 
depending on their nationality.118 
Recently, snipers from the U.S. military “fatally shot three pirates 
holding an American cargo-ship captain hostage after seeing that one 
of the pirates ‘[was leveling] an AK-47 at the captain’s back.’”119  The 
pirates threatened to avenge their comrades’ deaths by killing U.S. 
sailors they would take hostage in the future.120  Obviously, in such a 
situation the pirates’ motives go beyond financial objectives, but to 
deny that they are pirates because of their political, as opposed to 
financial, objective seems absurd.  Nevertheless, shortly after 
publicizing their threat, the Somali pirates carried it out by attacking 
an American freighter with rockets.121  One of the pirate 
commanders, Abdi Garad, was reported to have said:  “We intended 
to destroy this American flagged ship and the crew on board but 
unfortunately they narrowly escaped us.”122  In another case, members 
of the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) disguised themselves as 
tourists in order to board the M/S Achille Lauro, whereupon the 
group “threatened to blow up the cruise ship if Israel did not release 
                                        
 115. See Clyde H. Crockett, Toward a Revision of the International Law of Piracy, 26 
DEPAUL L. REV. 78, 90 (1976) (arguing that it would be “unwise to foreclose forever 
the possibility that a State, or those acting in behalf of a State, may come within the 
ambit of piracy”). 
 116. For example, on May 31, 2009, the M/V Stolt Strength sustained damage from 
the automatic gun and rocket propelled grenade fire of pirates.  INT’L MARITIME 
ORG., REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS:  ACTS REPORTED 
DURING MAY 2009 (MSC.4/Circ.137) 5 (June 17, 2009). 
 117. ICC Commercial Crime Services, International Chamber of Commerce, IMB 
Piracy Report Highlights Trouble in African Waters, July 10, 2008, http://www.icc-ccs.org 
/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=157:imb-piracy-report-highlights-
trouble-in-african-waters&catid=60:news&Itemid=51. 
 118. See, e.g., INT’L MARITIME ORG., REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY 
AGAINST SHIPS:  ACTS REPORTED DURING DECEMBER 2009 (MSC.4/Circ.147) Annex 1 at 
1–2 (Jan. 5, 2009) (reporting that in December alone, at least fifty-seven people were 
taken hostage). 
 119. Hostage Captain Rescued; Navy Snipers Kill 3 Pirates, CNN.COM, Apr. 12, 2009, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/12/somalia.pirates/. 
 120. Pirates Vow to Kill U.S., French Sailors, CNN.COM, Apr. 13, 2009, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/13/somalia.pirates.revenge. 
 121. Mustafa Haji Abdinur, Pirates Take Revenge on U.S. Ship, NATIONAL POST, Apr. 
15, 2009, available at http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=1498592. 
 122. Id. 
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fifty Palestinian prisoners.”123  Some argue that because of the PLF’s 
political motivations fueled this attack, the group should not be 
considered pirates.124  In a complex world where material gains are 
often intermingled with political objectives, such hairsplitting 
distinctions may only deprive the international community of an 
important tool in the suppression of piracy.  Justice Story of the U.S. 
Supreme Court made a great insight when, many years ago, he noted: 
A pirate is deemed, and properly deemed, hostis humani generis. . . . 
If he willfully sinks or destroys an innocent merchant ship, without 
any other object than to gratify his lawless appetite for mischief, it 
is just as much a piratical aggression, in the sense of the law of 
nations, and of the act of Congress, as if he did it solely and 
exclusively for the sake of plunder, lucri causa[.]  The law looks to it 
as an act of hostility, and being committed by a vessel not 
commissioned and engaged in lawful warfare, it treats it as the act 
of a pirate, and of one who is emphatically hostis humani generis.125 
The International Law Commission (ILC) appears to support the 
foregoing proposition.  The ILC cited Mr. Matsuda, Rapporteur of 
the Sub-Committee on the League of Nations Committee of Experts 
for the Progressive Codification of International Law, who said that 
“[i]t is better, in laying down a general principle, to be content with 
the external character of the facts without entering too far into the 
often delicate question of motives.”126  The ILC also cited L. 
Oppenheim who expressed a similar view: 
In the regular case of piracy the pirate wants to make booty . . . .  
But he remains a pirate, whether he does so or whether he kills the 
crew and appropriates the ship, or sinks her. . . .  [T]he cargo need 
not be the object of his act of violence. . . .  [I]t is likewise piracy if 
he stops a vessel merely to kill a certain person on board, although 
he may afterwards free vessel, crew, and cargo.127 
The ILC followed the Harvard Research Draft of the Harvard 
Research Center,128 which had observed:  “The draft convention 
                                        
 123. See Bahar, supra note 2, at 27. 
 124. See id. at 27 n.114 (elaborating that although it is not clear whether the initial 
seizure took place in Egyptian territory or on the high seas, it is clear that the hostage 
phase occurred on the high seas). 
 125. Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232 (1844). 
 126. Summary Records of the 290th Meeting, [1955] 1 Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n, 40 U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/SR.290  (internal citations omitted). 
 127. Id. 
 128. In 1932, the Harvard Research in International Law Group created the Draft 
Convention on Piracy.  See Piracy, 26 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 739 (1932).  Article 7(1) of 
this Draft Convention permitted “hot pursuit,” which allowed a state to pursue a 
pirate vessel into the territorial seas of a foreign state if the pursuit began in its own 
territorial waters or on the high seas.  Id. at 744.  Some countries followed this 
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excludes from its definition of piracy all cases of wrongful attacks on 
persons or property for political end . . . .  [T]here seems no good 
reason why jurisdiction over genuine cases of this type should not be 
confined to the injured State.”129  It is also important to note that 
drafters of the UNCLOS explicitly failed to delete animus furandi 
from their definition of piracy, because piracy “may be prompted by 
feelings of hatred or revenge, and not merely by the desire for 
gain.”130 
C. Territorial Jurisdiction and State Sovereignty 
For the purposes of territorial jurisdiction, the definition of piracy 
restricts acts of piracy to those committed on the high seas.131  But 
often times, pirates target ships in territorial waters that are home to 
some of the most popular commercial shipping lanes.132  In fact, most 
incidents of attacks on commercial vessels have occurred in territorial 
waters133 within the jurisdiction of a coastal state.134  The 2008 annual 
report of the IMO indicates that “[m]ost of the attacks worldwide 
were reported to have occurred or to have been attempted in the 
coastal States’ concerned territorial waters while the ships were at 
anchor or berthed.”135  The IMO has made the same observation in 
                                        
Convention until the United Nations adopted the 1958 Convention on the High 
Seas, and UNCLOS.  But under UNCLOS, a state may engage in hot pursuit only 
when the pirate ship is within the territorial sea of the pursuing state.  UNCLOS, 
supra note 18, art. 111, ¶¶ 1–3.  The right of hot pursuit terminates as soon as the 
suspected pirate vessel enters the territorial waters of another state.  Id.; see also Ethan 
C. Stiles, Note, Reforming Current International Law to Combat Modern Sea Piracy, 27 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 299, 305–10 (2004) (arguing that the change from the 
Harvard Convention to UNCLOS resulted from concern for a state’s sovereign right 
to control its territorial water). 
 129. Summary Records, supra note 126. 
 130. ILC REPORT 1956, supra note 50. 
 131. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 101. 
 132. See Matthew C. Houghton, Comment, Walking the Plank:  How United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1816, While Progressive, Fails to Provide a Comprehensive 
Solution to Somali Piracy, 16 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 253, 255 (2009) (noting that 
“Somali pirates target shipping lanes that feed the Suez Canal and the Gulf of 
Aden”). 
 133. Barry Hart Dubner, Human Rights and Environmental Disaster—Two Problems 
that Defy the “Norms” of the International Law of Sea Piracy, 23 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 
7, 34 (1997); see also Jesus, supra note 109, at 383 (noting that, as reported by the IMB 
and IMO, “two-thirds [of piracy incidents] consistently take place inside coastal 
states’ territorial waters”). 
 134. UNCLOS, supra note 18, arts. 8, 2, 49; see Jesus, supra note 109, at 380 
(advancing the position that the inapplicability of international piracy rules to 
territorial waters is a major shortcoming of the current legal regime). 
 135. INT’L MARITIME ORG., REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST 
SHIPS:  ANNUAL REPORT—2008 (MSC.4/Circ.133) ¶ 5 (Mar. 19, 2009) [hereinafter 
IMO ANNUAL REPORT 2008]. 
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each of the previous three years.136  Even still, it is unlikely that all of 
the affected countries would allow the navies of other nations to 
operate in their territorial waters.137  As long as international rules 
regarding piracy do not apply to territorial waters, responsibility to 
combat acts that would otherwise qualify as piracy belongs solely to 
the coastal state, even when such a state is unwilling or unable, for 
political, financial, or other reasons, to suppress robbery against 
vessels in its own sovereign waters.138 
By confining the scope of the definition of piracy to acts 
committed in specific geographic areas, the UNCLOS assumes the 
existence of a coastal sovereign state that is functional and capable of 
defending the territorial waters off its coast.  Somalia refutes this 
assumption in the extreme, as contemporary piracy is rampant there 
due to dysfunctional and failed government, a paucity of laws 
regulating piracy, and an inadequate system for legal enforcement.139  
These issues were exemplified in June, 2007, when pirates hijacked a 
Danish cargo ship, the M/V Danica White, off the Somali coast.140  In 
response, an American warship pursued the pirates, but called the 
chase off once the pirates reached the territorial waters of Somalia.141  
Because its only role was that of the pursuing state, the United States 
had no power under international law to prosecute any of the 
suspected pirates.142  The incongruity here is apparent as an act may 
constitute piracy if it is committed on the high seas but will not be 
covered by international rules concerning piracy if it is committed in 
                                        
 136. IMO ANNUAL REPORT 2007, supra note 30, ¶ 5; IMO ANNUAL REPORT 2006, 
supra note 5, ¶ 5; IMO ANNUAL REPORT 2005, supra note 5, ¶ 5. 
 137. See Ctr. for Int’l Law, N.Y. Law Sch., Avast! International Law and Piracy on the 
High Seas, INT’L REV., Fall 2008, at 5. (observing that countries such as Indonesia have 
limited the scope of Resolution 1816 so that it applies only to the unique situation in 
Somalia). 
 138. Scholars have commented that the insistence on state sovereignty in 
territorial waters is probably an obsolete notion due to today’s technology.  See, e.g., 
Dubner, supra note 133, at 40 (“The three-mile cannon shot rule, the creation of the 
exclusive economic zone, and the end of the cold war . . . have made the need for a 
belt of territorial waters measured twelve miles from the baseline obsolete.”). 
 139. See Avast!, supra note 137, at 4–5 (observing that Somalia’s government is far 
from recovered from a protracted civil war, which has allowed piracy to flourish). 
 140. Id. at 4. 
 141. See id.  In 1991, a similar scenario unfolded with regard to the M/V Erria Inge, 
an Australian-owned and Cyprus-registered ship.  After commandeering the ship 
from the port of Bombay, pirates later sold it for scrap in China.  Kavanagh, supra 
note 111, at 139.  Although the evidence overwhelmingly suggested that the theft, 
control, and ultimate sale of the vessel was organized from Singapore, under 
international law regarding piracy, the Singaporean government did not have 
jurisdiction to prosecute the pirates.  Id.  This was because the piratical acts originally 
occurred in the territorial waters of another coastal state and piracy under the 
UNCLOS covers only acts on the high seas.  Id. 
 142. See UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 111. 
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the internal or territorial waters of a coastal state.  Indeed, this is still 
the case even when the act is not considered piracy under a coastal 
state’s domestic laws.143  In such circumstances, the offended state has 
no jurisdiction to exercise power over the suspects unless the laws of 
the coastal state expressly authorize such jurisdiction.144  
Unfortunately, the “extradite or prosecute” clause of the 1988 
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation (SUA) does not apply to piracy.145 
D.  Hot Pursuit in Territorial Waters 
In less extreme cases, states have varying levels of competence with 
regard to the extent to which they control their territory and 
territorial sea.  The right of hot pursuit is especially relevant here.  
The notion of hot pursuit, however, also does not provide a sufficient 
solution.  Hot pursuit is exclusively a coastal state right.146  According 
to Article 27 (1)(b) of the UNCLOS, a coastal state may exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over the crew of a foreign vessel (that is, flying 
the flag of another state) “if the crime is of a kind to disturb the 
peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea”147—that 
is, if the effects of criminal activity extend to the coastal state.  Under 
Article 27(5) of the UNCLOS: 
[T]he coastal state may not take any steps on board a foreign ship 
passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to 
conduct any investigation in connection with any crime committed 
before the ship entered the territorial sea, if the ship, proceeding 
from a foreign port, is only passing through the territorial sea 
without entering internal waters.148 
Thus, even if acts that qualify as piratical were committed in that 
portion of the sea, the coastal state may not exercise jurisdiction. 
Moreover, Article 111 of the UNCLOS specifically relates to a 
coastal state’s right of hot pursuit, providing: 
                                        
 143. See Rothwell, supra note 16 (explaining that, in the case of Somalia, the 
government lacked the ability to effectively enforce piracy laws in its own waters). 
 144. See id. (arguing that “the current legal regime is not comprehensive with 
respect to the enforcement of either international law or domestic criminal law 
against those responsible for pirate attacks”). 
 145. Unless the states in question are both parties to SUA, the acts in question fall 
within the definition of unlawful acts of Article 3, or the states are parties to a 
bilateral extradition treaty.  Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation, art. 3, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221, 224–25 
(1988) [hereinafter SUA]. 
 146. Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, Foreign Naval Intervention in Cases of Piracy:  Problems 
and Strategies, 14 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 353, 360 (1999). 
 147. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 27, ¶ 1. 
 148. Id. art. 27, ¶ 5. 
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[H]ot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the 
competent authorities of the coastal State have good reason to 
believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations of that 
State.  Such pursuit must be commenced when the foreign ship or 
one of its boats is within the internal waters, the archipelagic 
waters, the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of the pursuing 
State, and may only be continued outside the territorial sea or the 
contiguous zone if the pursuit has not been interrupted.149 
The ILC recognizes that the right of hot pursuit derives from the 
regulations adopted by the Second Committee of The Hague 
Conference, but that it differs from the 1930 regulations in some 
respects.150  This means, for example, that if pursuit of suspected 
pirates begins in the territorial waters of Kenya or Yemen, it must be 
terminated as soon as the pursuit enters the territorial waters of 
Somalia, unless Somali authorities grant the pursuers explicit 
permission to continue the pursuit. 
As incidents of piracy have proliferated, so has the deployment of 
navies to counter piracy.  But this response has its limitations.  Article 
107 of the UNCLOS provides that only warships, military aircraft, or 
other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as representing 
government services authorized by the government may carry out a 
seizure on account of piracy.151  This seems to indicate that seizures by 
private ships would not be authorized under the purview of this 
provision.  In light of contemporary challenges, however, this seems 
to be an overly constraining provision.  In the wake of the American 
M/V Maersk Alabama incident, there was praise for the way the crew 
had acted in self-defense, and it was hoped that future crews would be 
equipped to respond not just to executed attacks, but also to 
suspected attacks in order to contain the problem of piracy.152  Yet, 
even an act in self-defense seems to fall outside the scope of this 
provision.153  The deficiencies of this provision illustrate an overly 
state-centric conception.  The commentary of the ILC on Article 45 
of the Convention on the High Seas, a provision similar to Article 107 
                                        
 149. Id. art. 111, ¶ 1. 
 150. See ILC REPORT 1956, supra note 50, at 285 (stating that the commission’s 
rules only differ from those of The Hague Conference in defining zones in which hot 
pursuit may be undertaken and whether aircraft may participate in hot pursuit). 
 151. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 107. 
 152.  See Pirates Foiled in a Second Attack on Maersk Alabama Cargo Ship, CNN.COM, 
Nov. 19, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/11/18/maersk.alabama 
.pirates/index.html?iref=allsearch (noting that the crew of the M/V Maersk Alabama 
later used force to repel a subsequent pirate attack). 
 153. See Kavanagh, supra note 111, at 144 (noting that the International Law 
Commission commentary indicates that acts of self defense by a merchant ship are 
not covered under Article 107).  
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of the UNCLOS, urges that “State action against ships suspected of 
engaging in piracy should be exercised with great circumspection, so 
as to avoid friction between States.”154  Hence, it is important that the 
right to take action be confined to warships.155  The commentary 
adds: 
Clearly this article does not apply in the case of a merchant ship 
which has repulsed an attack by a pirate ship and, in exercising its 
right of self-defense, overpowers the pirate ship and subsequently 
hands it over to a warship or to the authorities of a coastal State.  
This is not a “seizure” within the meaning of this article.156 
What happens when a suspected pirate vessel being pursued by a 
foreign government’s warship manages to escape into the territorial 
waters of a coastal state that is unwilling to continue pursuing the 
pirate vessel?  The UNCLOS expressly provides that “[t]he right of 
hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial 
sea of its own State or of a third State.”157  This provision defers to the 
sovereignty of other states, but it also assumes that the coastal state of 
the ship pursued or the third state is willing and able to capture and 
prosecute the suspected pirates.  As contemporary piratical acts 
amply demonstrate, deference to other states’ sovereignty largely 
ignores the reality that some states are either unwilling or unable to 
prosecute suspected pirates.  The UNCLOS places limitations on 
daring action.  Under Article 110 of the UNCLOS, a warship must 
first send an officer-led party to board a suspected pirate ship to verify 
any suspicions.158  The warship cannot simply open fire; rather, any 
inspection has to be carried out “with all possible consideration.”159  
The provision’s language sounds “rather tentative,” as one 
commentator has observed.160 
The UNCLOS provides for a restrictive form of innocent passage 
through the territorial sea and through the straits of the coastal 
states.  With respect to territorial sea, the treaty provides for innocent 
passage of warships, as long as the ship complies with state laws and 
regulations for passage; otherwise, it may be ordered to leave the 
territorial sea.161  With respect to straits, the treaty requires ships, 
including warships, to proceed through straits without delay and to 
                                        
 154. ILC REPORT 1956, supra note 50, at 283. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 111, ¶ 3. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Reynolds, supra note 25. 
 161. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 30. 
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“refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, [or] 
territorial integrity . . . of the States.”162  At least one commentator has 
argued that this means that a foreign warship has no chance of 
undertaking antipiracy activities in a state’s coastal waters under the 
UNCLOS without the permission of the coastal state, unless it wishes 
to risk the possibility of sanctions.163  Any intervention in these areas 
would depend upon the existence of separate bilateral or multilateral 
agreements.164 
All state parties to the UNCLOS have a duty to cooperate to the 
“fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or 
in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.”165  Again 
though, this obligation ceases as soon as pirates cross into the 
territorial or internal waters of a coastal state.  According to the 
commentary of the ILC on a similarly worded definition for piracy in 
Article 39 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, “where 
the attack takes place within the territory of a State, including its 
territorial sea, the general rule should be applied that it is a matter 
for the State affected to take the necessary measures for the 
repression of the acts committed within its territory.”166  However, 
coastal states have no international obligation to enact domestic laws 
aimed at combating acts considered to be piracy under international 
law. 
E.  Deficiencies in the Definition of Piracy 
The SUA attempts to address forms of maritime violence that are 
not included in the UNCLOS definition.  The SUA extended the 
definition of piracy to include attacks within territorial waters, but it 
did not extend the scope of universal jurisdiction to cover such 
attacks.167  Not only does SUA apply to offenses committed in almost 
all areas of the oceans, including territorial waters,168 it also requires 
state parties to either prosecute or extradite perpetrators of maritime 
violence.169  The SUA leaves unanswered, though, the question of 
what happens in situations where the coastal state is unwilling or 
unable to prosecute suspected pirates or extradite them to a third 
                                        
 162. Id. art. 39, ¶ 1. 
 163. See Menefee, supra note 146, at 360 (arguing that the UNCLOS may prevent 
foreign ships from assisting in antipiracy efforts). 
 164. Id. 
 165. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 100. 
 166. ILC REPORT 1956, supra note 50, art. 39. 
 167. SUA, supra note 145, art. 4. 
 168. Id. arts. 4, 6. 
 169. Id. art. 10, ¶1. 
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state.  Whether extradition or prosecution takes place remains a 
matter exclusively within the discretion of the state.170  In addition, 
the SUA requires that perpetrators or victims be nationals of a state 
party to the convention.171  This effectively undercuts the jus cogens172 
and erga omnes character of the crime of piracy, which confers 
universal jurisdiction to prosecute the crime.  Furthermore, the 
obligations under the SUA attach only to states that are parties to the 
treaty.173 
It has also been noted that the definition of piracy is a bit 
ambiguous to the extent that it proscribes only “illegal” acts of 
violence.174  As John Noyes points out, this ambiguity could be 
interpreted to mean that some acts of violence are legal even when 
carried out in the same context.175  The term “illegal” could, for 
example, contemplate the concept of “legal” violence by insurgents. 
Debate continues over whether acts of violence committed within a 
country’s 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), but beyond its 
territorial waters, qualify as acts of piracy since the definition only 
refers to acts committed on the high seas.176  The concept accepted by 
the ILC is narrower in scope.177  Under international law, piracy is 
limited to the high seas, which, as defined under the UNCLOS, 
excludes economic zones and archipelagic waters.178  Yet, no country 
has jurisdiction over the high seas—jurisdiction which Article 86 of 
the UNCLOS defines as “all parts of the sea that are not included in 
the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea, or in the internal 
waters of a State . . . .”179  Article 86 substantially reduces states’ 
jurisdiction over piracy, because less than one in five incidents of 
maritime violence qualify as high-seas piracy under the UNCLOS 
standards.180  Although Article 58 of the UNCLOS provides that the 
                                        
 170. See Garmon, supra note 84, at 273 (noting that while a state is obligated to 
either prosecute or extradite any detained suspect, there are no regulations 
governing when a state must take which action). 
 171. SUA, supra note 145, art. 6. 
 172. See Garmon, supra note 84, at 273 (noting that SUA essentially prevents piracy 
from being a jus cogens offense because if neither the coastal state nor the 
apprehending state establishes jurisdiction, a third-party country may not intervene). 
 173. SUA, supra note 145, art. 6. 
 174. See Noyes, supra note 101, at 106–07 (discussing how certain definitions from 
treaties relating to the high seas contain information that is too vague to create 
bright-line rules governing piracy). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 108. 
 177. ILC REPORT 1956, supra note 50 (stating that acts of piracy are limited to 
waters that are outside the jurisdiction of states). 
 178. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 86. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Menefee, supra note 91, at 146. 
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portion of the treaty that covers piracy also applies to the EEZ insofar 
as those articles are not incompatible with the rights of coastal states, 
that inclusion does not ameliorate the situation where a coastal state 
is incapable of policing or enforcing these delegated rights.181 
Interestingly, the ILC took a different approach with respect to 
piracy in “unoccupied territory,” and stated that “in considering as 
‘piracy’ acts committed in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State 
. . . the Commission did not wish to exclude acts committed . . . 
within a larger unoccupied territory, since it wished to prevent such 
acts committed on ownerless territories from escaping all penal 
jurisdiction.”182  It is difficult to imagine how different such 
“ownerless” territories are from the “high seas,” where state authority 
is virtually non-existent.  As “ownerless” territories present the same 
problem as the “high seas,” it would be reasonable for those 
territories to fall within the purview of Article 101 of the UNCLOS. 
III. UNITED NATIONS:  THE SECURITY COUNCIL’S LEGAL RESPONSES TO 
PIRACY AND ITS FAILED EFFORTS 
The United Nations is empowered to trump claims of sovereignty 
when it acts in the interest of international peace and security.183  
Recourse to Article 103 of the U.N. Charter, which has permitted the 
adoption of several resolutions in circumvention of Article 111(3) of 
the UNCLOS, has not been sufficient to provide for a prosecutorial 
regime.184  In light of this loophole in the UNCLOS, the “United 
Nations Security Council responded proactively throughout 2008, [to 
the recent rise in piracy], by adopting Resolutions that for the first 
time conferred upon maritime powers the capacity to enter Somali 
waters to conduct anti-piracy operations and to facilitate the 
prosecution of suspected pirates.”185  The situation in Somalia 
probably did not constitute a threat to international peace and 
security.186  Still, most of the recent U.N. Security Council Resolutions 
                                        
 181. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 58. 
 182. ILC REPORT 1956, supra note 50, at 282 (emphasis added). 
 183. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 (providing that the United Nations is not to 
intervene in the matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state, but that this principle “shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII”). 
 184. See id. art. 103 (“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the 
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations 
under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present 
Charter shall prevail.”). 
 185. Rothwell, supra note 16. 
 186. But see Al Qaeda Fighters Move into Horn of Africa, Officials Say, CNN.COM, June 
12, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/06/12/alqaeda.africa/index.html 
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have been created under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, implying 
that they are legally binding on all states.187 
In Resolution 1872, passed in 2009, the U.N. Security Council 
recognized that instability in Somalia fostered the problem of piracy 
and that combating piracy and its underlying causes will require a 
comprehensive response.188  If the situation in Somalia was left alone, 
the Council recognized, it would continue to pose a threat to 
international peace and security in the region.189  The Council has in 
the past recognized “the Transitional Federal Government’s (TFG) 
inability to interdict, or upon interdiction to prosecute pirates or to 
patrol and secure the waters off the coast of Somalia . . . .”190  In 
response to the lacuna in the UNCLOS,191 the U.N. Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1816, which authorizes states that cooperate with 
the Somali TFG to “enter the territorial waters of Somalia for the 
purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at seas.”192  
Although the intervention of the Council through its various 
resolutions helped to fill some gaps in the UNCLOS by extending 
enforcement jurisdiction, jurisdictional loopholes remain, and they 
are compounded by the lack of political will of some members of the 
international community to engage in law enforcement.193  One 
critical shortcoming of the Council’s responses is that they are 
limited in scope because they deal solely with the situation in 
Somalia.  They do not extend to pirate attacks that may take place off 
adjacent coasts or in other parts of the world.194  From a normative 
standpoint, the U.N. Resolutions do not attempt to establish 
customary international because they restrict their application to only 
the particular situation in Somalia.195 
                                        
(noting that officials believe that al-Qaeda is setting up headquarters in Somalia and 
Yemen). 
 187. Article 25 of the United Nations Charter provides that “Members of the 
United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.”  
U.N. Charter art. 25.  Some of the Resolutions taken under Chapter Seven include:  
Resolution 1872 and Resolution 1851.  See S.C. Res. 1872, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1872 
(May 26, 2009); S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 1. 
 188. S.C. Res. 1872, supra note 187. 
 189. Id. 
 190. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 1 (emphasis added). 
 191. See supra Part II (observing, among other things, that the definition of piracy 
excludes criminal acts occurring in the territorial sea of a coastal state, which would 
otherwise qualify as acts of piracy). 
 192. S.C. Res. 1816, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008). 
 193. Rothwell, supra note 16. 
 194. Id. (noting, for example, that the Resolutions do not address pirate attacks 
off the coast of nearby Kenya). 
 195. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 1 (providing that “this resolution shall not 
be considered as establishing customary international law”). 
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As subsequent events since the passage of these Resolutions have 
shown, the global piracy problem has only been exacerbated.  Apart 
from Somalia, other areas experiencing more frequent acts of piracy 
include the Gulf of Guinea near Nigeria and Niger, the Malacca 
Strait between Indonesia and Malaysia, and the Indian subcontinent 
between India and Sri Lanka.  Under these circumstances, the United 
Nations should move toward a more permanent and resolute piracy 
enforcement mechanism. 
As piracy activities off the Somali coast escalated, the U.N. Security 
Council was prompted to adopt Resolution 1838 in September, 2008.  
The Resolution called upon U.N. member states with “naval vessels 
and military aircraft operat[ing] on the high seas and airspace off the 
coast of Somalia to use . . . the necessary means, in conformity with 
international law . . . for the repression of acts of piracy.”196  One 
month later, the Council renewed Resolution 1816 with the adoption 
of Resolution 1846, an action that extended the international 
community’s mandate for an additional twelve months.197  The 
Resolution permitted operations in Somali waters and allowed the 
international community to operate on land where pirates could 
potentially plan or begin to undertake acts of piracy.198 
IV. INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL ON THE LAW OF THE SEA AND PIRACY 
To stem the rising tide of piratical activities, which have so far 
defied international efforts, it is necessary to assure would-be pirates 
that they cannot perennially act with impunity.  To this end, one 
proposal has been to create an ad hoc tribunal to deal with pirates.199  
Such an initiative would resolve the particular difficulties 
encountered in law enforcement in Somalia and would provide the 
international community with a better option than failing to 
prosecute suspected pirates.200  Because it is acknowledged that this 
would only be a temporary solution, others have proposed a 
permanent International Piracy Tribunal, modeled after the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), with special piracy jurisdiction.201  
Although the ICC provides a tested example with which the 
                                        
 196. S.C. Res. 1838, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008). 
 197. S.C. Res. 1846, Preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008). 
 198. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 1. 
 199. Rothwell, supra note 16. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
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international community could work, such a new tribunal “would 
require detailed legal and political consideration.”202 
One commentator has suggested that “[w]ith the United Nations 
Security Council recognising the threat to international peace and 
security posed by piracy and sea robbery, and being prepared to 
respond to the challenges by utilising its Chapter VII powers, it 
becomes a short step for the Council to establish an ad hoc 
‘International Piracy Tribunal.’”203  However, the United Nations has 
struggled to keep even its current tribunals operational and has at 
times resorted to hybrid tribunals—those with a mixture of national 
and international jurisdiction.  Indeed, this is one reason why the 
United Nations supported the creation of the ICC.204  With those 
lessons in mind, the United Nations may be very reluctant to establish 
another tribunal. 
Over the years, states have prevented the adoption and 
enforcement of a coherent and effective regulation of relevant laws.205  
Until such regulation is established, there can only be ad hoc 
solutions to the problem of piracy.206  Because piratical acts 
committed inside the jurisdictional sovereignty of the coastal state are 
regarded as acts of robbery, and not piracy, coastal states are not 
required, and have no incentive, to pursue international cooperation 
in combating such acts.207  While this system certainly reflects that 
state sovereignty is highly valued, the international community 
rejected the idea that state sovereignty is absolute when it adopted a 
series of international human rights agreements permitting 
intervention when a country’s government commits atrocities against 
its own citizens.208 
It is inconceivable that piracy, a crime regarded as one that is 
committed against the human race, should not be suppressed and 
prosecuted at the international level as effectively as other 
internationally cognizable offenses.  Not only does the UNCLOS fail  
                                        
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Tom Dannenbaum, Crime Beyond Punishment, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L LAW & 
POL’Y 189 (2009). 
 205. See Jesus, supra note 109, at 367–68 (noting that piracy is widely recognized as 
an international problem, but that individual states have not been receptive to 
international solutions). 
 206. Id. at 368. 
 207. Id. at 372. 
 208. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 (“Nothing contained in the present 
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members 
to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle 
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”). 
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to impose any obligation on its signatory state parties to prosecute 
and punish pirates, it also leaves discretion to each state to decide 
whether or not the state will exercise jurisdiction to try suspected 
pirates and to what extent it will punish those convicted of the 
crime.209  But this jurisdiction may or may not be exercised by the 
state in question.  This permissive regime is a lacuna in international 
law that exists in the wake of what are becoming increasingly violent 
seas.210  Piracy demands both universal jurisdiction as well as 
international jurisdiction. 
A. Universal Jurisdiction and International Jurisdiction 
The prospect of creating a permanent Piracy Tribunal is unlikely 
given the resource constraints faced by the United Nations and the 
length of time it takes to negotiate international agreements.  Some 
propose, instead, an expansion of the jurisdiction of the ICC.211  This 
accommodation, however, would create logistical issues.  For 
example, the Statute of the ICC would have to be amended to 
include the specific crime of piracy.  Considering how long it took to 
conclude the Rome Statute of the ICC, and because important actors 
like the United States are still on the sidelines in that regard,212 this 
would, perhaps, not be a viable solution. 
The establishment of a special international tribunal has been 
criticized on the ground that it leaves the crime of piracy under the 
domain of traditional universal jurisdiction, which would permit any 
state to prosecute suspected pirates, regardless of their nationality, as 
long as they are found in the territory of the prosecuting state.  The 
seriousness of international piracy has been recognized since ancient 
times, hence the designation of pirates as hostis humani generis—a 
common enemy or enemy of all humankind.213  For the most part, the 
enforcement of international law regarding piracy has historically 
                                        
 209. Jesus, supra note 109, at 374–75. 
 210. The IMO publishes yearly reports detailing the total numbers of violent acts 
committed by pirates.  See, e.g., IMO ANNUAL REPORT 2008, supra note 135, ¶ 6 
(noting that in 2008, crews were violently attacked by “groups of five to ten people 
carrying knives or guns” and that 6 crew members were killed, 42 were injured, 774 
were kidnapped or held hostage, and 38 are still missing). 
 211. See, e.g., Bahar, supra note 2, at 26 (suggesting that piracy be added to the 
Rome Statute of the ICC). 
 212. See generally Eugene Kontorovich, The Constitutionality of International Courts:  
The Forgotten Precedent of Slave-Trade Tribunals, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 39 (2009) (describing 
the history and constitutionality of the American participation (or lack thereof) in 
international courts like the ICC). 
 213. See Erik Barrios, supra note 101, at 149, 152 (recognizing that “international 
law treats piracy as a universal crime” because it “can inflict harm upon all states”). 
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been left to municipal courts.214  A pirate’s actions have always been 
considered as so contrary to fundamental norms that they are 
universally proscribed, and thus the pirate is subject to punishment 
by all courts.  In fact, in United States v. Smith,215 the U.S. Supreme 
Court—describing piracy as “robbery, when committed upon the 
sea”—acknowledged that piracy is “an offence against the universal 
law of society, a pirate being deemed an enemy of the human race.”216  
Even though a few states are willing “to try pirates whose nationality, 
vessel and victims are totally unconnected to [that state],” with the 
volume and frequency of piracy cases on the rise, the current 
jurisdictional laws have proven insufficient.217  Contemporary piracy is 
a completely different threat than traditional piracy envisioned under 
the UNCLOS.  An effective response requires more than ad hoc or 
piecemeal efforts such as U.N. Security Council resolutions or 
impromptu tribunals, which are only tools used to curtail the 
jurisdictional sovereignty of states. 
Moreover, universal jurisdiction tends to increase interstate 
tensions, and extending the definition of piracy to include acts 
motivated by political ends would only exasperate such tensions.218  
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has had to settle cases where 
                                        
 214. Noyes, supra note 101, at 105. 
 215. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820). 
 216. Id. at 161–62.  In the S.S. Lotus case, heard by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in 1927, John Bassett Moore stated, “[A]s the scene of the 
pirate’s operations is the high seas, which is not the right or duty of any nation to 
police, he is denied the protection of the flag which he may carry, and is treated as 
an outlaw, as the enemy of mankind—hostis humani generis—whom any nation may in 
the interest of all capture and punish.”  The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J 
(ser. A) No. 10., at 65, 70 (Moore, J., dissenting); see also Harmony v. United States, 
43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232 (1844) (recognizing that piracy is a universal crime); 
United States v. Chapels, 25 F. Cas. 399, 403 (C.C.D. Va. 1819) (finding that piracy is 
a universal crime punishable by all nations); United States v. Jones, 26 F. Cas. 653, 
655, 658 (C.C.D. Pa. 1813) (finding that the defendant was not guilty of piracy for 
acts committed against the Portuguese Triumph of Mars, but acknowledging that 
piracy is a felony under the laws of the United States). 
 217. Noyes, supra note 101, at 115. 
 218. For example, Henry Kissinger argues that universal jurisdiction can be 
employed to “settle political scores.”  Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal 
Jurisdiction, 80 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 86, 88 (2001).  He also argues that such jurisdiction is 
likely to “subject the accused to the criminal procedures of the magistrate’s country, 
with a legal system that may be unfamiliar to the defendant and that would force the 
defendant to bring evidence and witnesses from long distances.”  Id. at 90.  Diane 
Orentlicher argues that when “a court exercises universal jurisdiction . . . it judges 
conduct that took place within another country in light of law that was developed 
through processes that transcend both states’ lawmaking institutions.”  Diane F. 
Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with Democratic Principles, 92 
GEO. L.J. 1057, 1063 (2004).  But Kenneth Roth thinks that this “fear . . . is 
overblown,” and points out that “[g]overnments regularly deny extradition to courts 
that are unable to ensure high standards of due process.”  Kenneth Roth, The Case for 
Universal Jurisdiction, 80 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 150, 153 (2001). 
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Belgium tried to exercise such jurisdiction regardless of the 
underlying merits of the case.219  In recent times, Belgium and other 
nations have also been discredited for engaging in selective 
prosecution.220  Universal jurisdiction leaves the question of “who to 
prosecute” solely to the discretion of each state, whereas 
international jurisdiction commits the international community as a 
whole to act in a concerted way to combat piracy. 
Some countries have been reluctant to invoke universal jurisdiction 
to prosecute suspected pirates.  However, a few European countries 
that have expressed doubts about prosecuting Somali pirates have 
been at the forefront of exercising universal jurisdiction through 
other means.  For example, “France, one of the more active nations 
in the piracy campaign, regularly resorts to repatriation of pirates to 
Somalia.”221 
International law works best when nations cooperate to resolve a 
common problem that no single country is willing or able to engage 
unilaterally, except at a great cost.  Pirates cannot be allowed to 
succeed, as there is simply too much at stake.  One major 
shortcoming in the efforts to thwart piracy has been the lack of an 
established international criminal tribunal that can administer 
international criminal justice against suspected pirates.  This 
deficiency has been exposed by the gravity and intractability of 
contemporary piracy.222  Without much discussion of pros and cons, 
some commentators have suggested that “the time is now ripe to 
consider the creation of a specialist international criminal tribunal to 
deal with pirates.”223  The benefit of “[s]uch a Tribunal [is that it] 
would be able to prosecute individuals responsible for acts of piracy 
                                        
 219. See, e.g., Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 
I.C.J. 3, 9 (14 Feb.) (discussing a Belgian law that purports to grant Belgian courts 
universal jurisdiction where there are grave breaches of international law). 
 220. For example, Belgium and Spain have had to limit the scope of their 
universal jurisdiction laws in order to avoid prosecuting former officials of the Bush 
administration, an action that would have likely caused serious political tensions 
between the United States and the two nations.  See, e.g., Marlise Simons, Spanish 
Court Weighs Inquiry on Torture for 6 Bush-Era Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2009, at A6 
(reporting that a Spanish court had “taken the first steps toward opening a criminal 
investigation into allegations that six former high-level Bush administration officials 
violated international law by providing the legal framework to justify the torture of 
prisoners at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba,” but also noting that “some American experts 
said that even if warrants were issued their significance could be more symbolic than 
practical, and that it was a near certainty that the warrants would not lead to arrests if 
the officials did not leave the United States”). 
 221. Kontorovich, supra note 14. 
 222. See generally Rothwell, supra note 16 (discussing the recent upsurge in piracy 
and the need for “a more comprehensive legal regime dealing with threats to 
maritime security”). 
 223. Id. 
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under the UNCLOS or crimes against international shipping as 
envisaged under the SUA Convention.”224 
Without a doubt, there are risks that come with having multiple 
tribunals; a primary concern is the possibility that inconsistent 
jurisprudence will be created.  From its inception, some have argued 
against the existence of the ITLOS and its jurisdiction because the 
ICJ and its predecessor—the Permanent Court of International 
Justice—had already produced jurisprudence relating to disputes 
concerning the law of the sea.225  They argued further that the ITLOS, 
at best, amounts to a duplication of previous efforts and, at worst, 
risks the creation of inconsistent jurisprudence.  Still, the advantages 
of the ITLOS can be succinctly summed up as follows: 
New economic and scientific uses of the seas are also on the 
increase, raising new legal questions which the Tribunal is well-
placed to answer with its expertise and state-of-the-art facilities.  
Use of the Tribunal by States, international organizations or private 
entities for contentious or advisory proceedings can only serve to 
enhance the harmonized implementation of the Convention . . . 
and help reinforce coherence in international law.226 
It seems that piracy is so intrinsically linked to the regime of the 
Law of the Sea that it would be a natural step to designate 
enforcement jurisdiction to the ITLOS.  Determining whether such a 
step would be appropriate, however, requires an examination of the 
competency of the ITLOS. 
B. The ITLOS Under Consideration 
To begin, the UNCLOS does not authorize the ITLOS to hear 
piracy cases brought against individuals, hence it provides no 
personal jurisdiction.  Whereas any of the signatories to the 
International Covenant on the Law of the Sea can bring a case to the 
ITLOS, its jurisdiction is limited to the provisions of the treaty.227  The 
                                        
 224. Id. 
 225. See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 6 (25 July) 
(concerning dispute over Iceland’s jurisdictional waters); Fisheries Jurisdiction 
(F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 175 (25 July) (same). 
 226. Rüdiger Wolfrum, President of the Int’l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 
Statement of Acceptance of the ‘Award for Meritorious Contribution Towards the 
Development, Interpretation and Implementation of International Maritime Law,’ 
presented to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, on the occasion of 
the 2008 Graduation Ceremony of the IMO (May 3, 2008), available at 
http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow “Statements of the President” hyperlink 
under “News”; then follow “Statements of President Wolfrum 2005–2008” hyperlink). 
 227. See, e.g., UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 292 (“The court or tribunal shall deal 
without delay with the application for release and shall deal only with the question of 
release . . . .”). 
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ITLOS is part of the UNCLOS compulsory third-party dispute 
resolution mechanism.228  Arguably, states might invoke the provisions 
of the UNCLOS on compulsory settlement of disputes in order to 
bring interstate disputes over the interpretation of the UNCLOS 
provisions on piracy to a tribunal.229  The chances of that happening, 
though, are low, because states are often reluctant to bring their 
citizens’ cases before international tribunals.230  The UNCLOS does 
not explicitly compel or authorize a particular tribunal to hear piracy 
cases brought against individuals.231  Article 105 provides: 
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of 
any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or 
aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest 
the persons and seize the property on board.  The courts of the 
State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties 
to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with 
regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of 
third parties acting in good faith.232 
Under the UNCLOS, all dispute-settlement procedures are open 
only to state parties.233  In addition, the UNCLOS provides only 
limited possibilities for individual access to the ITLOS.234  So far, the 
Tribunal only entertains cases in which individuals’ cases are 
espoused by the flag state.  In the M/V Saiga (No.2) Case (Saint Vincent 
v. Guinea),235 the ITLOS held that it is the obligation of the flag state 
to espouse claims of the people on a vessel even if they have different 
nationalities because the vessel must be viewed as a “unit.”236  The 
ITLOS stated: 
                                        
 228. Id. arts. 286–87. 
 229. Noyes, supra note 101, at 113. 
 230. See, e.g., Nottebohm Case (Liech.v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J 4 (6 Apr.).  In the 
Nottebohm case, Guatemala opposed Liechtenstein’s claim to espouse Nottebohm’s 
complaint against Guatemala on the basis that he was a naturalized citizen of 
Liechtenstein.  Id. at 12–13.  In fact, Nottebohm had never lived in Liechtenstein but 
had instead lived in Guatemala for thirty-four years.  Id. at 25.  The case illustrates the 
difficulties involved with relying on diplomatic protection in proceedings before 
international tribunals that do not allow individual access.  In an even more 
pertinent example, Canada refused to espouse the case of a corporation registered in 
Canada even though the ICJ ruled that it was Canada—and not Belgium—that had 
the right to bring the case against Spain.  Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., 
Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1964 I.C.J. 6, 14, 62, 83 (24 July). 
 231. See John E. Noyes, Compulsory Third-Party Adjudication and the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 4 CONN. J. INT’L L. 675, 684 (1989) (noting 
that the UNCLOS leaves some control of the adjudication process to states by 
providing them “with four options for formal adjudication”). 
 232. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 105 (emphasis added). 
 233. Id. art. 291. 
 234. UNCLOS, supra note 18, at Annex VI, art. 20. 
 235. 120 I.L.R. 143 (Int’l Trib. L. of the Sea 1999). 
 236. Id. ¶ 106. 
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The provisions . . . indicate that the Convention considers a ship as 
a unit, as regards the obligations of the flag State with respect to 
the ship and the right of a flag State to seek reparation for loss or 
damage caused to the ship by acts of other States and to institute 
proceedings under article 292 of the Convention.  Thus the ship, 
every thing on it, and every person involved or interested in its 
operations are treated as an entity linked to the flag State.  The 
nationalities of these persons are not relevant.237 
The ITLOS can play an important role in countering international 
piracy.  The current president of the ITLOS, José Luis Jesus, has 
stated that the Tribunal is “ready to judge each piracy case that states 
want it to deal with.”238  With respect to the powers of the ITLOS, the 
president has said the Tribunal, acting as a full court, 
may give an advisory opinion . . . as provided for in article 138 of 
the Rules.  This article further indicates that the request for an 
advisory opinion is to be transmitted to the Tribunal by “whatever 
body” is authorized under such an agreement to do so.  As the 
international community faces new challenges in ocean activities, 
such as piracy and armed robbery, advisory proceedings before the Tribunal 
on legal questions concerning the application and interpretation of 
provisions of the Convention may prove to be a useful tool to States.239 
It may not be necessary to look any further than to the UNCLOS 
and to the Statute of the ITLOS for such a tool.240  Because flag states 
rarely demonstrate interest in prosecuting pirates, the following 
question arises:  Can a person on a ship with a nationality other than 
that of the flag state have his nation of origin bring his case before 
the Tribunal?  Because issues of conflict of jurisdiction can arise, the 
U.N. Security Council called “upon all States . . . of victims and 
perpetrators of piracy and armed robbery . . . to cooperate in 
                                        
 237. Id. 
 238. UN Sea Court Ready to Judge Piracy Cases:  Report, OTTAWA CITZEN, Apr. 22, 2009, 
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/story_print.html?id=1523227&sponsor=. 
 239. H.E. José Luis Jesus, Statement by President of the International Tribunal For 
the Law of the Sea On Agenda Item 70(a) at the Plenary of the Sixty-Third Session of 
the United Nations General Assembly, ¶ 9 (Dec. 5, 2008) (emphasis added), available 
at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (follow “News” hyperlink to “Statements of 
the President” hyperlink). 
 240. Under the UNCLOS, the ITLOS has “jurisdiction over any dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of an international agreement related 
to the purposes of [UNCLOS], which is submitted to it in accordance with the 
agreement.”  UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 288, ¶ 2.  Under the Statute of the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Annex VI of the UNCLOS), the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal includes all matters specifically provided for in any 
agreement, other than the Convention, which confers jurisdiction upon the 
Tribunal.  Id., annex VI, art. 21. 
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determining jurisdiction, and in the investigation and prosecution of 
persons responsible for acts of piracy.”241 
Just as the United Nations refers certain cases to the ICC, the 
United Nations should refer cases to the ITLOS once that Tribunal is 
determined to be an appropriate body for enforcement purposes. 
V. ENFORCEMENT OF PIRACY PROVISIONS:  NATIONAL AND REGIONAL 
International strategies to enforce piracy laws must always remain 
complementary to national strategies.  This must also be the case with 
respect to international human rights laws and international criminal 
laws.242  To that end, it is important that states develop and strengthen 
national approaches to combating piracy. 
With respect to national efforts, much remains to be done to 
ensure that normative and enforcement regimes are both 
comprehensive and effective.  Piracy law at the national level is 
different from international piracy law in several respects.  In cases 
involving municipal crimes relating to piracy, jurisdiction is reserved 
to the nation state.  The jurisdiction of a state over acts of piracy is 
based upon nationality or territoriality, and coastal states have the 
sole jurisdiction to prosecute and punish acts of piracy committed 
within their internal waters, territorial sea, and on their flag ships.243  
There must be a genuine link between the state and the ship, or 
between the state and the waters on which an offense takes place.  
The ability of a flag state to apply and enforce its own laws with 
respect to piracy and sea robbery taking place in the waters of 
another state depends on whether the pirate ship or the pirates have 
the nationality of that state, or the degree to which the national law 
of the enforcing state makes piracy a universal crime that is subject to 
arrest and prosecution throughout the world.244 
In the S.S. Lotus case,245 the Permanent Court of International 
Justice held that “vessels on the high seas are subject to no authority 
                                        
 241. S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 197. 
 242. See, e.g., Rome Statute of The International Criminal Court, art. 17(1)(a) , 
July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (providing that a case is inadmissible before the 
International Criminal Court if it “is being investigated or prosecuted by a State 
which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution”). 
 243. Rothwell, supra note 16. 
 244. James Kraska & Brian Wilson, The Pirates of the Gulf of Aden:  The Coalition Is the 
Strategy, 45 STAN. J. INT’L L. 243, 268 (2009) (noting that many states’ criminal law 
does not extend beyond the boundaries of the territorial sea and that it is unlikely 
that such nations will be able to prosecute pirates). 
 245. (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7). 
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except that of the State whose flag they fly.”246  Article 92 of the 
UNCLOS codifies this principle,247 but excepts cases where the vessel 
is without nationality or where the vessel is engaged in piracy, slavery, 
or unauthorized broadcasting.248  The practice of using open 
registries complicates matters.  Many African states use open 
registries because they have limited resources available to them to 
register ships.  The problem is that open registries create a loophole 
that protects pirates by enabling vessels without nationality and 
vessels flying under the flag of a state without effective enforcement 
jurisdiction to become “floating sanctuaries from authorities.”249  If 
flag states are incapable of effectively exercising control over the 
ships they have registered, how can they be expected to enforce 
piracy laws at all?  Yet, there is no requirement for a genuine link to 
the flag state.  In other words, there is no requirement that the flag 
state be capable of fulfilling its obligations pertaining to the status of 
a flag state.250  In piracy cases, and in cases involving the ineffective 
enforcement regimes of flag states, universal jurisdiction could be 
invoked, but such jurisdiction can only provide a remedy but cannot 
provide a means to prevent piracy in the first instance. 
Several countries have enacted their own domestic legal regimes to 
deal with acts analogous to piracy that occur in their own territorial 
waters.  For example, the U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to 
define and punish piracy.251  Pursuant to this constitutional 
empowerment, the U.S. Congress has authorized the prosecution and 
punishment of any person who, “on the high seas, commits the crime 
of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought 
                                        
 246. Id. at 25. 
 247. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 92. 
 248. Id. art. 110. 
 249. United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1382 (11th Cir. 1982) 
(“Vessels without nationality are international pariahs. . . .  Moreover, flagless vessels 
are frequently not subject to the laws of a flag-State.  As such they represent ‘floating 
sanctuaries from authority’ and constitute a potential threat to the order and stability 
of navigation on the high seas.” (citations omitted)); see George D. Gabel, Jr., 
Smoother Seas Ahead:  The Draft Guidelines as an International Solution to Modern-Day 
Piracy, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1433, 1439–40 (2007) (explaining that “[r]egistration in flags-
of-convenience states is easy and may be completed often without inspection of the 
vessel” and that many countries were motivated to open registries mainly so that they 
could partake in the cash flow generated by the registration of ships, but that the 
loosening of standards provided “fertile ground for growth in piratical acts”). 
 250. In M/V Saiga (No.2) Case (Saint Vincent v. Guinea), the ITLOS found that there 
was nothing in UNCLOS that entitled other states to reject a vessel’s nationality on 
the ground that the flag state was incapable of exercising proper jurisdiction.  120 
I.L.R. 143, ¶¶ 82–86 (Int’l Trib. L. of the Sea 1999). 
 251. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.10 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . to define 
and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against 
the Law of Nations.”). 
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into or found in the United States.”252  Moreover, the U.S. Congress 
passed the Hostage Taking Act, which provides that whoever seizes an 
American national abroad in order to obtain a ransom for the release 
of that national “shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of 
years or for life, and if the death of any person results, shall be 
punished by death or life imprisonment.”253 
Not all countries have specific laws or provisions in their penal 
codes that deal with piracy.  In fact, some countries do not define 
piracy in their laws,254 nor do they criminalize acts of piracy on the 
high seas or in their own Exclusive Economic Zones,255 even if they 
wish to allow universal jurisdiction.  Countries that do have piracy 
provisions in their laws define the crime differently depending on 
their needs.  For example, until recently, the Japanese piracy law did 
not allow Japanese defense forces to operate beyond the shores of 
Japan, which meant that pirates could target vessels flying under the 
Japanese flag outside of Japanese waters without fear that they would 
be captured by Japanese forces.256  As a consequence of its domestic 
law, Japan was unable to contribute to an international effort to 
capture pirates beyond its shores. 
The lack of uniformity in the definition of piracy throughout the 
world,257 in conjunction with the complete absence of any definition 
of piracy in some countries, will continue to impede efforts to reduce 
                                        
 252. 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 960–67 (2006) (pertaining to 
foreign relations matters involving piracy); 33 U.S.C. §§ 381–87 (2006) (regarding 
regulations for suppression of piracy). 
 253. 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (2006).  Some commentators have noted that, even though 
U.S. domestic law is in place to prosecute piracy, there is a possibility that a due 
process constitutional challenge may render enforcement of the piracy law 
unconstitutional.  See, e.g., Noyes, supra note 101, at 117 (arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 
1651 might violate the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the U.S. Constitution because the law may not afford fair notice about wrongful 
conduct, and asserting that § 1651’s reference to the “law of nations”—which is not 
sufficiently specific—might run afoul of the constitutional requirement that the law 
be clear on its face). 
 254. William P. Willig, Comment, The Santa Maria Incident:  A Grey Zone Between 
Unrecognized Insurgency on the High Seas and Piracy Jure Gentium, 25 ALB. L. REV. 299, 
303  (1961). 
 255. Robert C. Beckman, Issues of Public International Law Relating to Piracy and 
Armed Robbery Against Ships in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, 3 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 512, 518 (1999). 
 256. See Editorial, Anti-Piracy Law, THE JAPAN TIMES, June 23, 2009.  Japan’s new 
antipiracy law now allows Japanese Self-Defense Forces to protect commercial ships, 
both Japanese and non-Japanese, from pirates operating beyond Japanese waters.  See 
id. (“The Diet has enacted a law that will enable the dispatch of [Japanese] Forces . . . 
any time and anywhere in the world.”). 
 257. Zou Keyuan, Issues of Public International Law Relating to the Crackdown of Piracy 
in the South China Sea and Prospects for Regional Cooperation, 3 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
524, 535 (1999). 
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incidents of piracy.  Clearly, the improvement of domestic laws, 
especially those pertaining to jurisdiction over piracy, is vital to 
ensuring an effective enforcement regime. 
A. Regional Enforcement of Piracy Law 
The idea of regional cooperation is certainly not new, and many 
successes have been realized as a result of such cooperation in areas 
such as human rights, security, and trade.  Therefore, previous efforts 
to cooperate on a regional level may be worth emulating in order to 
combat other threats that are both regional and international in 
nature.  The U.N. Charter underscores the importance of regional 
cooperation.258  Regionalism may have thrived in the past due to the 
conditions of the Cold War, and although it is certainly not 
flourishing today, its many advantages have kept the concept alive.259  
In targeting the specific problem of piracy, the U.N. Security Council 
has accentuated the importance of regional cooperation in some of 
its resolutions.  For example, the Council called on “States, [and] 
regional and international organizations that have the capacity to do 
so, to take part actively in the fight against piracy and armed robbery 
at sea off the coast of Somalia,” and encouraged “all States and 
regional organizations fighting piracy and armed robbery at sea off 
the coast of Somalia to consider creating a centre in the region to 
coordinate information relevant to piracy and armed robbery at sea 
off the coast of Somalia.”260 
Hot pursuit is one area in particular that could significantly benefit 
from increased regional enforcement.  Hot pursuits often begin in 
the “internal waters, territorial waters, contiguous zones or the EEZs 
of the coastal states.”261  But the right to pursue ends as soon as a 
chase enters the territorial waters of a third state.262  Regional 
cooperation could remedy this and other problems associated with 
piracy.  As the Secretary General of the IMO remarked: 
                                        
 258. See generally U.N. Charter arts. 52–54 (encouraging the development of 
regional arrangements). 
 259. Regional cooperation is based on factors such as social and cultural 
homogeneity, similarity of attitudes and social patterns of behavior, common goals, 
political and/or economic interdependence, and strong geographical contiguity, 
among others.  Eibe Reidel, The Progressive Development of International Law at the 
Universal and Regional Level, in STRENGTHENING THE WORLD ORDER:  UNIVERSALISM V. 
REGIONALISM 115, 132 (1990).  Regional arrangements carry greater global legitimacy 
than do global arrangements because they are less likely to be seen as impositions. 
 260. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 1. 
 261. Keyuan, supra note 257, at 538. 
 262. Id. 
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Looking to the future, it seems clear to me that . . . the long-term 
solution to the problem of piracy and armed robbery off the coast 
of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden . . . should be looked for within 
the region itself.  Strong and coordinated coast guard and law 
enforcement capabilities; appropriate and workable legal 
provisions so that the perpetrators of the crime of piracy do not 
escape with impunity for their acts . . . [—]all these are necessary if 
the rule of law is to hold sway . . . [and] most of them are currently 
missing from Somalia and the adjacent region.263 
Regional cooperation can help states avoid potential jurisdictional 
conflicts and can reduce costs.  Furthermore, a legal framework for 
regional cooperation is already in place.  Article 123 of the UNCLOS 
provides a basis for state parties to the treaty to cooperate in the 
suppression of piracy.264 
B. Effective Strategies 
South East Asia stands out as a success story of how regionalism can 
be used to combat piracy.  Sixteen nations in that region signed the 
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)265—the first treaty dedicated 
solely to combating piracy—following a spate of incidents of piracy in 
the area.  The agreement obligates signatory parties to extradite 
pirates who are present in their territories to the territories of other 
signatory parties upon their request.266  Perhaps it is now time for 
other regions to adopt similar regional agreements to combat piracy.  
However, it is important to point out that based on statistics compiled 
by the IMO—including South East Asia where regional cooperation 
was implemented and every country in that region made piracy a 
punishable crime—the results were modest and failed to reduce 
piratical acts in any substantial manner.267 
The UNCLOS provides that “[a]ll States shall cooperate to the 
fullest extent possible in the repression of piracy on the high seas . . . 
.”268  This may include the creation of regional agreements.269  The 
IMO has concluded that “[r]egional cooperation among States has 
an important role to play in solving the problem of piracy and armed 
                                        
 263. Efthimios E. Mitropoulos, Secretary-General, International Maritime 
Organization, Welcoming Remarks (Feb. 24, 2009), available at http://www.imo.org/ 
newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1774&doc_id=11124. 
 264. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 123. 
 265. Apr. 28, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 829 [hereinafter ReCAAP]. 
 266. Id. art. 12. 
 267. Jesus, supra note 109, at 369. 
 268. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 100. 
 269. Id. art. 311, ¶ 3. 
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robbery against ships, as evidenced by the success of the regional anti-
piracy operation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.”270  
Accordingly, the IMO sought to replicate the successes in South East 
Asia by facilitating regional cooperation in Somalia, the Gulf of Aden, 
and the Gulf of Guinea to combat contemporary piracy.271  In January, 
2009, the IMO facilitated the adoption of an important regional 
agreement in Djibouti among states in the region.272  The regional 
cooperation resulted in the creation of the Code of Conduct 
Concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, an 
agreement that recognizes the extent of the problem of piracy and 
armed robbery against ships in the region.273  In the agreement, 
signatories declared their intention to cooperate to the fullest 
possible extent, in a manner consistent with international law, in the 
repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships.274  Significantly, 
the signatories agreed to commit themselves, among other things, to 
“ensuring that persons committing or attempting to commit acts of 
piracy or armed robbery against ships are apprehended and 
prosecuted.”275 
As one commentator noted: 
Seeking to replicate the success of ReCAAP, the IMO sponsored 
meetings in Tanzania and Djibouti to reach an agreement among 
the regional states of the Horn of Africa for developing a treaty 
against piracy in the western Indian Ocean.  Once an agreement is 
reached among the States of East Africa, the maritime nations 
would embark on a program to build capacity for investigative and 
judicial action.  If nations in East Africa develop the legal 
architecture to deal with piracy, including lawyers, courtrooms and 
confinement facilities, they would be more willing and better able 
to enforce the maritime rule of law in the western Indian Ocean.276 
Replicating the South East Asian experiment, however, in East 
Africa or the other regions of Africa, where geographical, economic, 
                                        
 270. Int’l Maritime Org., Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, 
http://www.imo.org (follow “Facilitation” hyperlink; then follow “Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships” hyperlink) (last visited June 3, 2010). 
 271. See Int’l Maritime Org., Piracy in Waters off the Coast of Somalia, 
http://www.imo.org (follow “Facilitation” hyperlink; then follow “Piracy and armed 
robbery against ships” hyperlink; then follow “Piracy in waters off the coast of 
Somalia” hyperlink) (last visited June 3, 2010). 
 272. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 108, ¶ 9. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Piracy in Waters off the Coast of Somalia, supra note 271. 
 276. James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Piracy Repression, Partnering and the Law, 40 J. 
MAR. L. & COM. 43, 54–55 (2009). 
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and social conditions are vastly different from South East Asia, would 
be extremely difficult.  Compared to the South East Asia region, the 
African region faces dire economic and structural challenges, 
including the fact that the South East Asia cooperation efforts were 
led by Japan—an economic powerhouse.277  Although there is no 
similar power in East Africa, the pooling of resources and 
international assistance might help.278 
Another distinction between the South East Asia region and East 
Africa region is the fact that the economies of all sixteen countries in 
South East Asia depend on maritime trade.  Perhaps African 
countries, especially those without a significant shipping operation, 
might not see the urgency in developing a regional treaty for 
combating piracy.  Indeed, given the poverty problem and other 
internal problems faced by many African states, it is unlikely that such 
states would individually or collectively devote significant time or 
resources to the fight against piracy.279  The African Union has tried 
to pay attention to maritime trade, and to the extent that the 
continent is interested, has begun to build a framework to enforce 
piracy law on a regional level.280  The African Union’s Contact Group 
on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) met in Cairo on March 
16, 2009, and observed that 
[n]eighboring States can play an essential role in addressing the 
phenomenon of piracy off the Somali coast.  That role may include 
                                        
 277. GROUP 4 OF THE CONTACT GROUP ON PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA, 
IMPROVING DIPLOMATIC AND PUBLIC INFORMATION EFFORTS ON ALL ASPECTS OF PIRACY 3, 
available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/UA/Conferences/2009/mars/PSC/ 
16MARSBIS/CGPCS_WG%204.pdf (last visited June 3, 2010) [hereinafter WORKING 
GROUP 4] (noting that the primary causes of piracy off the Somali coast are the 
fragile political and security situation in the area along with the poor economic 
conditions). 
 278. In June 2009, the Somali transitional federal government established a new 
navy, in part, to combat piracy off its coast.  Analysts Skeptical New Somali Navy Can 
Fight Piracy, VOANEWS.COM, June 18, 2009, http://www.voanews.com/english/ 
archive/2009-06/2009-06-18-
voa34.cfm?CFID=279231309&CFTOKEN=27674671&jsessionid=0030d599e2410ad57
1f6387e20796b56312d.  But analysts observed that the real priority of the fledgling 
administration was to fight “for its survival against al-Shabab,” and they predicted that 
the administration’s focus would be “fighting the war on land.”  Id.  It is unrealistic to 
expect such a government to raise a competent navy at a time when it is struggling 
for its very survival.  Id. 
 279. See id. (expressing doubt as to Somalia’s likelihood of success with respect to 
its efforts to end piracy because the country neglects its naval facilities and lacks 
experienced sailors and ships, especially with the near-daily battles between the U.N.-
backed government and al-Qaida-linked militant groups). 
 280. WORKING GROUP 4, supra note 277, at 1 (explaining that the objective of the 
African Union’s Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia is to establish “a 
wide public information campaign that includes outreach activities such as seminars 
and workshops and a coordinated media strategy”). 
ISANGA.OFFTOPRINTER.CORREX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/2010  6:45 PM 
2010] COUNTERING PERSISTENT CONTEMPORARY SEA PIRACY 1311 
. . . sending a message to potential pirates that their territories will 
not act as a safe haven for pirates or a destination for the proceeds 
of piracy.  They may also cooperate through joint training of their 
Coast Guards, and the harmonization of legislation governing 
piracy and armed robbery against ships to prevent impunity for 
pirates . . . .281 
The United Nations has also pointed to efforts by the League of 
Arab States—a region that is arguably better financially resourced 
than the East Africa region.  A report by the U.N. Secretary General 
noted that “[t]he League of Arab States held an extraordinary session 
of the Arab Peace and Security Council in Cairo on November 4, 
2008 to examine the issue of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the 
coast of Somalia.”282  The meeting called for closer cooperation and 
exchange of information between Arab States and relevant 
organizations like the IMO.283  As one commentator has noted, “the 
Somali crisis has been entangled with complex regional conflict, 
which includes the Ethiopian-Eritrean impasse, the insurgency and 
counter-insurgency in the Ethiopia-Somali region, and the long-
running tensions between Ethiopian and Somali security interests 
and territorial claims.”284 
C. Comprehensive Approaches with a Focus on Somalia  
Legal solutions are important, but they need to be augmented with 
broader solutions that tackle the underlying causes of piracy.  The 
U.N. Secretary General spoke of the need to “be mindful that piracy 
is a symptom of the state of anarchy which has persisted in [Somalia] 
for over 17 years” and that “anti-piracy efforts must be placed in the 
context of a comprehensive approach which fosters an inclusive 
peace process in Somalia and assists the parties to rebuild security 
[and] governance capacity. . . .”285  The Somalis argue that piracy 
provides one of the only means of sustenance in dire humanitarian 
circumstances.286  The rise in Somali piracy correlates with the 
incompetence of Somalia’s weak central government, the conditions 
of the country’s impoverished and stagnant economy, and the failure 
                                        
 281. Id. ¶ 2. 
 282. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 108, ¶ 9. 
 283. Id. ¶ 9. 
 284. Developing a Coordinated and Sustainable Strategy for Somalia Before the Subcomm. 
on African Affairs of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 111th Cong. 17 (2009) (statement 
of Dr. Ken Menkhaus, Professor of Political Science, Davidson College). 
 285. Piracy Problem Inseparable from Overall Somali Crisis, Ban Warns, UN NEWS 
CENTRE, Dec. 16, 2008, http://www.un. org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=29334&Cr 
=somalia&Cr1=piracy. 
 286. Avast!, supra note 137, at 5. 
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of the international community to hold pirates accountable for their 
actions.287  In fact, Somalia has not had an effective and functioning 
central government since 1991.288  According to U.N. officials, piracy 
near Somalia began as a violent reaction to rampant illegal fishing by 
commercial fishing companies, mostly from European and Asian 
countries, which often operated with fake licenses.289  Some have even 
attempted to justify piracy on the ground that it is the only feasible 
response to the intractable and inequitable economic world and the 
lingering effects of colonialism, neocolonialism, and imperialism.290  
Despite these justifications, the United Nations has “[e]mphasiz[ed] 
that peace and stability, the strengthening of State institutions, 
economic and social development and respect for human rights and 
the rule of law are necessary to create the conditions for a full 
eradication of piracy.”291 
Because piracy has political, economic, security, and  
humanitarian dimensions, the international response must be 
similarly comprehensive and multifaceted.  There certainly is a need 
to address the socioeconomic root causes of piracy and a need to 
tackle this issue through a comprehensive approach.292  The example 
of Somalia, where pirates share multi-million-dollar ransoms in an 
                                        
 287. See Kraska & Wilson, supra note 276, at 44 (“Piracy seldom takes place in 
isolation, frequently occurring in concert with severe poverty, weak or no governance 
and economic stagnation.  Piracy is experiencing a renaissance, in part, because of 
the dire situation within Somalia.  The average annual income is estimated to be 
$650.  One attack can yield $10,000 for a working-level pirate.  It is not surprising 
that at least 1,400 Somali men are associated with organized criminal gangs that are 
engaged in piracy.  A pirate leader said, ‘When evil is the only solution, you do 
evil.’”); see also Bahar, supra note 2, at 19 (“Since 1991, Somalia has had no 
functioning government, no real laws, and no enforcement power.  When asked why 
he and his compatriots were caught with weapons, one of the ten suspected Somali 
pirates simply responded to me, ‘I am Somali; the gun is our government.’”). 
 288. Bahar, supra note 2, at 19. 
 289. Stephanie McCrummen, Somalia’s Godfathers:  Ransom-Rich Pirates, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 20, 2009, at A1, A8 (explaining that the foreign fishing vessels’ crews 
would spray Somali fishing vessels with hot water and bullets, sinking their boats 
and/or injuring some of them, and that it was in response to such show of force that 
Somali fishermen started to carry AK-47 assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades 
and took ransom in order to attend to the wounded). 
 290. Piracy has not always had a negative connotation.  See, e.g., A.T. Whatley, 
Historical Sketch of the Law of Piracy, 3 LAW MAG. & REV. 536, 536–37 (1874) (observing 
that “[a]mong the ancients . . . [s]o far from being a disgrace, and an illegal 
occupation, [piracy] was considered an honourable calling,” until international 
commerce grew and, with it, the necessity to protect it). 
 291. S.C. Res. 1838, supra note 196; S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 197. 
 292. See WORKING GROUP 4, supra note 277, at 1–4 (recommending the 
establishment of a public information campaign, the development of diplomatic 
efforts to bring political and security stability to Somalia, and the strengthening of 
the fishing industry as parts of a multi-pronged solution to piracy). 
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impoverished and war-torn country,293 calls for a complete and 
multilevel approach, one that must first include setting up a viable 
state in Somalia with naval capabilities.  Recently, the Somali 
transitional government has urged the international community to 
help Somalia build up its own navy as a “final solution” to the 
problem of piracy.294  Yet, even if the international efforts to patrol 
the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean were effective, which some 
reports refute, such efforts present only a short-term solution.295  
Ultimately, the solution lies with the Somali state.  Nevertheless, the 
idea that the solution lies entirely within the creation of a Somali navy 
is misguided.  Somalia is a country that, at present, does not even 
have a viable military to support the transitional government.  The 
country must instead rely on foreign troops for stability. 
Currently, Somalia epitomizes the piracy problem,296 but the 
problem is by no means limited to that region,297 nor is it a new 
phenomenon.298  For example, pirates operating off the Nigerian 
coast operate, in part, because of the political insurgency in the Niger 
Delta.299  These rebels claim to have engaged in piracy to promote 
their political goals and to push the government toward equitable 
distribution of profits from the oil industry.300 
                                        
 293. Katharine Houreld, Somali Pirates Seize Chinese Ship with 25 Crew, ABC NEWS, 
Oct. 19, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=8861410. 
 294. Zhang Haizhou, Piracy Solution Is New Somali Navy, Says Ambassador, 
CHINADAILY.COM.CN, Apr. 4, 2009, http://chinadaily.com.cn/world/2009-04/24/ 
content_7710730.htm. 
 295. See id. (noting that some international warships are patrolling irresponsibly, 
which is encouraging pirates to attack more ships). 
 296. In its 2008 annual report, the IMO noted that the areas most affected by 
piracy were East Africa and the Far East, in particular the South China Sea, West 
Africa, South America and the Caribbean, and the Indian Ocean.  IMO ANNUAL 
REPORT 2008, supra note 135, ¶ 5.  Over the period under review, the number of acts 
reported to have occurred or to have been attempted increased from 67 to 72 in the 
South China Sea and from 60 to 134 in East Africa.  Id.  There was a decrease, over 
the 2007 figures, from 60 to 50 in West Africa, from 40 to 26 in the Indian Ocean, 
from 12 to 2 in the Malacca Strait, from 25 to 19 in South America and the 
Caribbean, and from 7 to 1 in the Arabian Sea.  Id.  This represented an annual 
increase of nearly 200 percent in the critical trade corridor linking the Suez Canal 
and the Indian Ocean.  Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 108, ¶ 4. 
 297. See International Maritime Bureau, International Chamber of Commerce, 
Unprecedented Rise in Piratical Attacks, Oct. 24, 2008, http://www.icc-ccs.org/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=306:unprecedented-rise-in-
piratical-attacks&catid=60:news&It emid=51) (“Somalia, Nigeria, and Indonesia 
remain[ed] international piracy hotspots, ranking first, second and third in acts of 
piracy up to the end of [the third quarter of] 2008.”). 
 298. In the 1990s, this piracy was concentrated in South Eastern Asia, which at the 
time was experiencing a deep economic crisis. Barrios, supra note 101, at 150. 
 299. Avast!, supra note 137, at 5. 
 300. Id.  In United States v. The Ambrose Light, 25 F. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1885), a U.S. 
District Court enforced piracy provisions against insurgents who were recognized to 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Given how long and arduous a task it is to amend an international 
treaty, it would be easier to add a protocol to the UNCLOS that 
would provide both for the expansion of the jurisdiction of the 
ITLOS to include the prosecution of the crime of piracy and for the 
creation of regional courts where necessary.  Ad hoc U.N. resolutions 
can be helpful in specific situations and as temporary solutions.  In 
the long-term, however, it may well be necessary to adopt an 
additional protocol to the ITLOS that deals specifically with the 
problem of piracy as a means to enhance the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal over individual access to the court.  Such expanded 
jurisdiction should also extend to cases where pirates are caught in 
territorial waters off the coastal state, and when the central authority 
of a particular state is dysfunctional or non-existent.  Article 311, 
paragraph 3 of UNCLOS envisages such amendments.  The UNCLOS 
could also be amended to expressly provide for situations where 
countries are either unwilling or unable to prosecute pirates.301 
Enforcement measures should also address the possibility of cases 
brought “before the [t]ribunal . . . in the form of a complaint 
submitted by one State against another, accusing the defending State 
of not doing enough to combat piracy.”302  On this point, because 
states are unlikely to sue each other, the United Nations can seek 
advisory opinions from the ITLOS regarding enforcement issues 
related to piracy.303  Along similar lines, the President of the ITLOS 
has argued that “[a]s the international community faces new 
challenges in ocean activities, such as piracy and armed robbery, 
advisory proceedings before the Tribunal on legal questions 
concerning the application and interpretation of provisions of the 
Convention may prove to be a useful tool to States.”304 
                                        
have been fighting for political independence, though their actions were not carried 
out for private ends.  Id. at 412–13. 
 301. Consider, for instance, the Straits of Malacca.  The coastal states have “laws 
and effective governments[,] [as well as] the will to enforce the laws, but the 
hundreds of miles of coastline and numerous uninhabited islands make maritime law 
enforcement [prohibitively costly].”  Bahar, supra note 2, at 20.  Furthermore, 
navies—like the Indonesian Navy—are old and inefficient.  Id. 
 302. Rüdiger Wolfrum, Former President, Int’l Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 
Statement Given at the Übersee-Club, Hamburg:  The Value for Hamburg of the 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea—Profile, Expectations and Reality (Feb. 27, 2008), 
(transcript available at http://www.itlos.org). 
 303. Jesus, supra note 239, ¶¶ 8–9. 
 304. Id. 
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Amendments to the 1958 Convention on the High Seas305 have 
been proposed, but they were not adopted because it was felt at the 
time of the proposals that piracy was not a pressing problem.306  
Clearly, this is no longer the case.  One possible step that could be 
taken could be the elaboration of an international code on piracy, 
which could then be incorporated into the domestic legislation of the 
states that are parties to the treaty.  The lack of a comprehensive 
legislative framework has prevented some countries from adequately 
punishing pirates after they were convicted.307  An international code 
could help to harmonize several important legal structures on an 
international level, including procedures for exercising jurisdiction 
during the investigation of reported instances of piracy, standards of 
punishment for pirates, and an extradition scheme for dealing with 
accused pirates.308 
In order to counter piracy more expeditiously, the definition of 
piracy should be expanded to include violence that takes place in 
territorial waters.309  This definition would enable states to engage in 
hot pursuit of pirates into the territorial waters of third states as long 
as the pursuing state respected that state’s sovereignty by providing 
notice of pursuit to the coastal state.310  Since the U.N. Security 
Council has demonstrated that it views piracy as a serious crime by 
designating it as a threat to international peace and security311—a 
designation also given to terrorism—it would not be a huge 
departure for the Council to extend the far-reaching geographical 
scope of antiterrorism rules so that they apply to the rules against 
                                        
 305. Prior to the ratification of the Convention in 1958, a Committee of Experts 
for the Progressive Codification of International Law of the League of Nations also 
had proposed in Article 5 of the 1926 draft articles on the codification of piracy rules 
that “a pursuit commenced in the high seas may be continued even within the 
territorial waters unless the territorial State is in a position to continue such pursuit 
itself.”  Jesus, supra note 109, at 386 (citations omitted). 
 306. Id. 
 307. Press Release, Int’l Maritime Org., Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery 
Against Ships—Call for International Code (May 13, 1999), http://www.imo.org 
(follow “Newsroom” hyperlink; then follow “Press Briefings” hyperlink; then follow 
“Archives—1999 Press Briefings” hyperlink). 
 308. Id. 
 309. See Dubner, supra note 133, at 33–34 (explaining that “most of the human 
rights violations and losses to commercial shipping occur . . . in territorial waters,” 
which escapes enforcement due to the coastal state’s lack of desire to stop the acts, 
unless the definition is expanded). 
 310. Id. at 37–38. 
 311. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1838, supra note 196.  In Resolution 1844, the Council 
recognized “the role piracy may play in financing embargo violations by armed 
groups” and concluded that “the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat 
to international peace and security in the region.”  S.C. Res. 1844, Preamble, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1844 (Nov. 20, 2008). 
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piracy.  This change could be enacted without interfering with the 
sovereignty of the coastal state simply by amending the definition of 
piracy in the UNCLOS to include territorial waters. 
Alternatively, instead of modifying the current definition of piracy, 
a different course of action could be used to formulate a whole new 
offense that would capture private acts at sea perpetrated for political 
or terrorist objectives—as was done for aircraft hijacking.312  The 
advantages of formulating a new offense to fit the contemporary 
threat include a better description of the crime, a better description 
of the gravity of the offense, and a better tailored penalty.  However, 
in international law, the process of adopting a new international 
agreement is an arduous task.313  Modification of the UNCLOS is 
provided for under Article 311, which states that “[t]wo or more 
States Parties may conclude agreements modifying or suspending the 
operation of provisions of this Convention, applicably solely to the 
relations between them.”314 
As many commentators have suggested, one of the greatest possible 
reforms would be for international rules on piracy to “extend the 
regime of piracy to territorial waters,” but in such a way that a coastal 
state’s sovereignty would continue to be respected.315  The U.N. 
Security Council resolutions that permitted several international 
actors to enter Somalia’s territorial waters indicate that this is 
possible.  Although the Council has broadened the powers of all 
nations patrolling the Gulf of Aden to pursue pirates and bring them 
to justice, there has so far been no activity in the courts.316  To 
improve enforcement of the laws against piracy, the right of hot 
pursuit should extend to territorial waters and to the exclusive 
economic zone. 
The limitation imposed by the hot pursuit rules that prevents the 
capture of suspected pirates should be modified in light of current 
communications technology.  Now, it is possible for an ensnared 
vessel to inform the coastal state that it is under attack and that it is 
appealing to its national or flag state to exercise its jurisdiction and 
                                        
 312. See Kavanagh, supra note 111, at 138 (explaining how the 1970 Hague 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft paved the way for the 
1988 SUA Convention). 
 313. Id. at 137 n.52 (explaining that the delegates of the 1982 Convention on the 
Law of the Sea faced difficulties when they tried to agree “on an acceptable 
definition of piracy when there were in existence a variety of municipal legal 
traditions on the law of piracy”). 
 314. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 311, ¶ 3. 
 315. Jesus, supra note 109, at 382. 
 316. Douglas S. Malan, Maritime Attorneys Deal with High Seas Piracy, LAW.COM, Apr. 
24, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/law/sfb/lawArticleSFB.jsp?id=1202430155573. 
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protect it,317 unless the Council later determines that the coastal state 
is willing and capable of acting on its own. 
The lack of universal jurisdiction for acts of piracy committed in 
territorial waters is also particularly deserving of attention.318  
Capturing states or the ITLOS should be able to prosecute suspected 
pirates regardless of where the capture was accomplished, as long as 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that piracy was being or was 
about to be committed.319  Some commentators have suggested that 
foreign warships should be allowed to continue their hot pursuit into 
territorial waters so that pirates cannot easily evade capture and 
prosecution simply because they have been able to enter the 
territorial waters of another country.320  This should be the case even 
when the capture is not a result of hot pursuit.  In order to protect 
the sovereignty of the coastal state, it would be necessary to 
communicate with the coastal state before engaging the suspected 
pirates.  States should have the option to allow the coastal state to 
prosecute or extradite the suspected pirates captured in their 
territorial waters, subject to action by the U.N. Security Council in 
cases of noncompliance. 
The alternative procedure under Article 313 of the UNCLOS, 
however, may be more appealing.  Under Article 313, the U.N. 
Secretary General may circulate a proposed amendment to all state 
parties, without requiring a conference.321  The only hurdle is that if a 
state party, within a period of twelve months from the date of that 
circulation, objects to the proposed amendment, the amendment is 
considered rejected.322  Since the absence of any objection may very 
well be an unrealistic proposition, it is possible for two or more state 
                                        
 317. See, e.g., United States v. Conroy, 589 F. 2d 1258, 1267–68 (1979) (upholding 
a U.S. Coast Guard enforcement action in the Haitian territorial sea with Haiti’s 
consent). 
 318. But see Bahar, supra note 2, at 15 (arguing that “[u]niversal jurisdiction 
actually solves the problem of enforcement”).  Bahar also notes that any hopes of 
closing the gap posed by a lack of international enforcement within territorial waters 
is “improbable” and that, in any case, it is “inadvisable” since the harmed state can 
seek redress through diplomatic and military channels.  Id. at 16–17.  This argument 
is based on respect for national sovereignty.  Id.  The argument, however, presumes 
that there is a functioning state with which another state can deal, and that national 
sovereignty is absolute, a presumption which, under the U.N. Charter, is incorrect in 
situations where international peace and security are threatened.  Militarization of 
efforts to combat piracy would seem to undermine international law that aims to 
resolve disputes through peaceful means. 
 319. Jesus, supra note 109, at 386–87 (arguing for the implementation of an 
extradition and prosecution clause where alleged pirates escape into the territory of 
a country that cannot prosecute them). 
 320. Id. at 383–84. 
 321. UNCLOS, supra note 18, art. 313, ¶ 1. 
 322. Id. ¶ 2. 
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parties to agree on a bilateral or multilateral suspension or 
modification of the UNCLOS as long as they follow the conditions 
laid down by the UNCLOS, which states: 
Two or more States Parties may conclude agreements modifying or 
suspending the operation of provisions of this Convention, 
applicable solely to the relations between them, provided that such 
agreements do not relate to a provision derogation from which is 
incompatible with the effective execution of the object and 
purpose of this Convention, and provided further that such 
agreements shall not affect the application of the basic principles 
embodied herein, and that the provisions of such agreements do 
not affect the enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights or 
performance of their obligations under this Convention.323 
Instead of creating new regional organizations, especially in a 
resource-starved continent such as Africa, consideration should be 
given to linking regional cooperation for piracy suppression to 
existing regional arrangements such as the African Union.324  This 
could be accomplished with the enactment of an agreement under 
the auspices of the African Union.325  It is, after all, in the interest of 
the African Union to have safe waters surrounding its continent.  The 
African Court of Justice could establish chambers to prosecute 
suspected pirates with complementary jurisdiction to domestic 
jurisdiction.326  These efforts could very well allay fears that the ITLOS 
would be overwhelmed by piracy cases. 
Regarding enforcement and regional cooperation, waiver of 
jurisdiction by the flag state should hinge solely upon its willingness 
or ability to exercise jurisdiction.327  Thus, if the flag state fails to waive 
                                        
 323. Id. art. 311, ¶ 3. 
 324. See Timothy H. Goodman, Note, “Leaving the Corsair’s Name to Other Times”:  
How to Enforce the Law of Sea Piracy in the 21st Century Through Regional International 
Agreements, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 139, 162–63 (1999) (listing the economic 
community of the West African states and the Preferential Trade Area as examples of 
African multilateral regional agreements). 
 325. The adoption of the African Maritime Transport Charter in 1994 under the 
auspices of the African Union is a positive development in the right direction 
demonstrating that African States are interested not only in taking an active part in 
maritime trade but also in protecting such trade as well.  African Maritime Transport 
Charter, Dec. 15, 1993, available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/ 
Documents/Treaties/Text/AFRICAN_MARITIME_TRANSPORT.pdf.  However, this 
Charter does not mention piracy. 
 326. The African Court of Justice and Human Rights is empowered to interpret 
and apply treaties adopted within the framework of the African Union.  See Protocol 
on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, art. 28(b), Jul. 1, 
2008, available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/text/ 
Protocol%20on%20the%20Merged%20Court%20-%20EN.pdf. 
 327. See INT’L MARITIME ORG., PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS:  
RECOMMENDATIONS TO GOVERNMENTS FOR PREVENTING AND SUPPRESSING PIRACY AND 
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jurisdiction, either because it is unwilling or unable to do so, in 
certain cases the U.N. Security Council should be able to intervene 
and suspend such rights of the flag state without having to wait for 
that waiver. 
The domestic courts must be equipped as necessary to ensure that 
they have the ability to adequately implement the relevant law.  This 
should begin with accelerated stabilization of regions which have 
pirate-infested waters.  Once such regions are stable, it would be 
possible to enact and enforce laws relating to pirates or to extradite 
pirates for prosecution elsewhere. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, a review of the international law on piracy shows that the 
rules need to be updated to better combat crime on the high seas.  
Such updates should include the amendment of jurisdiction in 
Exclusive Economic Zones, territorial waters, and the archipelagic 
waters, and should not jeopardize the sovereignty of coastal states.  
Reform also requires the creation of a robust system of enforcement 
at the international level that is permanent and that measures up to 
the unique challenges of contemporary sea piracy.  As in the case of 
the law of war, where hot pursuit is permitted, it should likewise be 
possible for a state to intrude into waters within the jurisdictional 
sovereignty of a coastal State as long as it has permission and can 
demonstrate sufficient cause for doing so. 
Stand-alone strategies for dealing with piracy have been repeatedly 
undermined by other national and regional dynamics, which is why it 
is essential to look for broader approaches to the piracy problem.  
Turning to an international tribunal such as the ITLOS is one such 
approach.  By expanding the definition of piracy and by extending 
the jurisdiction of the ITLOS to include piracy, the prosecution of 
suspected pirates should be made more feasible.  Yet, even as 
significant normative and enforcement mechanisms are created, 
sufficient attention must be given to the root causes of piracy, which 
could likely be combated with the strengthening a country’s central 
government and with the establishment of a secure and peaceful 
society. 
                                        
ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS (MSC.1/Circ.1333 ) 21 (June 26, 2009), available at 
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_ id%3D25884/1333.pdf. 
